











































Building! reliable! systems! is! one! of! the!major! challenges! faced! by! software! developers! as!
society! is! becoming!more! dependent! on! software! systems.! The! failure! of! any! system! can!
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Providing" fault" tolerance" capability" at" the" implementation" level" is" the" traditional" way" for"
achieving"reliability"and"can"be"time"and"cost"effective."However,"modern"research"has"also"
focused"on"providing"fault"tolerance"at"the"requirement"specification"and"design"levels,"and"
formal"properties" relating" to" reliability"can"be"guaranteed"with" the"help"of"verification"and"
model"checking"support."
Various" fault" tolerance" mechanisms" have" been" developed" that" lie" mainly" in" two" major"
groups:" hardware" fault" tolerance" and" software" fault" tolerance" [Chen" and" Avizienis" 1978]."
Hardware" fault" tolerance" mechanisms" deal" with" physical) faults) in" hardware" components"




redundancy" through" the" replication" of" components" alongside" a" voting" mechanism," for"




[Chou" 1997]." In" data) diversity," a" software" system’s" input" data" is" changed" (reEexpressed)"
and/or" broken" down" into" smaller" units" and" then" later" reEcombined" [Amman" and" Knight"
1987]." In" contrast," design) diversity) proposes" the" use" of" different" versions" of" the" same"
software"system"[Avizienis"and"Chen"1977]."It"is"software"fault"tolerance"that"this"thesis"will"
focus"on."
In" general," the" early" efforts" in" building" fault" tolerant" systems"were" focused"mainly" at" the"
later"stages"of"software"development"such"as"the"implementation"level"and"integration"and"
testing"level."However,"dealing"with"fault"tolerance"concerns"in"the"early"phases"of"software"
development" can" help" developers" better" manage" software" risks" through" the" early"
identification" and" resolution" of" errors" and" faults" [Romonovsky" 2007]." Many" efforts" have"
already"been"made"to"provide"fault"tolerance"at"the"levels"of"requirement"specification"and"
design," e.g." providing" fault" tolerance" at" the" architectural" level," by" using" ADLs" or" formal"





development." Furthermore," the" thesis" focuses" on" providing" fault" tolerance" as" a" separate"
concern" that" is" orthogonal) to" the" underlying" system" behaviour." This" separation" of" fault"










logically" equivalent" yet" diverse" sets" of" input" [Amman" and" Knight" 1987]." The" NEcopy"
programming"approach"is"the"main"example"of"this"technique"in"which"each"copy"of"versions"
runs" in" parallel" with" different" sets" of" input" data." An" example" of" data" diversity" is" a"minor"










In" addition" to" these" two" styles" of" diversity," software" fault" tolerance" mechanisms" can" be"
divided"mainly" into"two"further"groups;"single)version"software"fault"tolerance"mechanisms"




include" checkpoint" and" restart" mechanisms," process" pairs," atomic" actions" and" exception"
handling"[Torres"2000].""
Checkpoints( and( restart( mechanisms( are" significant" effort" towards" fault" tolerance" and"
recovery."Although"this"is"considered"primarily"as"a"single"version"fault"tolerance"technique,"
it" is" also" used" in" multiple" version" techniques" like" Recovery" Block" (see" below)." In" this"
technique," states"of" the" system"are" saved"periodically" and,"on" the"occurrence"of" a" system"
failure," this" saved" state" is" used" to" restore" the" service" to" the" previous" checkpoint," and" the"
processing"can"resume"from"that"point."After" the"successful"completion"of" the"tasks," these"
checkpoints"are"deleted"to"save"the"memory"space"[Pradhan"1996]."
A( process( pair( is" also" a" single" version" technique." This" technique" uses" two" identical"
components" that" run" concurrently" on" different" processors" where" one" is" the" primary"
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processor" and" the" other" is" the" secondary" (or" backup)" processor." In" the" case" of" a" failure,"
control" from" the" primary" processor" passes" to" the" secondary" processor." In" this" technique,"
program"modules"are"used"to"decompose"a"problem" into" independent"components."These"
components" are" designed" to" have" built" in" protection" to" keep" any" abnormal" component"
behaviour" in" one" module" from" affecting" the" other" modules." Beside" fault" tolerance,"
additional"benefits"of"using"modularisation"include"testing"and"easier"maintenance"[Pradhan"
1996].""
An( atomic( action( comprises" of" a" group" of" processes," where" these" processes" can" interact"
with"each"other"but"not"with"the"rest"of"the"system."In"the"case"of"a"failure,"an"exception"is"
raised" and" all" of" the" processes" in" the" atomic" action" can" invoke" an" exception" handler" to"
handle"that"failure;"this"means"that"the"processes"have"the"ability"of"self"checking."Hence"the"
component"has"the"ability"to"detect"certain"errors"and"can"take"some"steps"to"prevent"them"








software" based" on" design" diversity" strategies" to" provide" fault" free" processing." In" design"
diversity" strategies,"design"of" the"software" is" typically"written"by"different"design" teams"to"
follow" the" same" specification." These" versions" can" be" executed" either" in" parallel" or"
sequentially." The" main" motivation" behind" the" different" versions" is" the" expectation" that"
components"built"differently"should"fail"differently"as"they"have"different"designers,"different"
algorithms,"and"different"design" tools." In"case"of" the" failure"of"one"version,"at" least"one"of"
the"alternative"versions"should"be"able"to"continue"processing"to"produce"the"correct"result."
Examples" of" these"mechanisms" include" recovery" block," NEversion" programming" and"NEself"
checking"programming.""
The"basic"Recovery(Block(mechanism"was"first"developed"by"Horning"et"al."in"1974"[Horning"
et" al." 1974]" and" was" implemented" by" Randell" in" 1975." Recovery" block" mechanisms" use"




such" that,"after"one"version"has"been" run," its"output" is"passed" through"an"acceptance" test"
(AT)." If" the" acceptance" test" is" passed" then" the" result" of" that" variant" is" considered" as" the"
overall"output."If"the"acceptance"test"fails,"the"system"should"use"checkpoints"and"retrieve"its"
saved" safe" state" or" errorEfree" state" to" restart" the" execution" from" that" state" but" using" the"
next"variant"[Randell"1975].""




appropriate" result." Alternatively," in" this"mechanism"a" sequential" execution" scheme" can"be"
used" along" with" checkpoints" to" save" the" state" of" the" primary" variant" before" an" alternate"
variant"is"executed"[Avizienis"1985]"[Hecht"1979].(
NJSelf( Checking( Programming( (NSCP)( was" developed" by" Laprie" et" al." in" 1988." This"
mechanism" uses" program" redundancy" to" check" its" own" behaviour" during" execution." The"
adjudicator" in"this"case"can"be"the"combination"of"both"the"acceptance"test"and"the"voter,"
referred" to" as" a" hybrid" voter." In" other"words," this"mechanism" itself" is" the" combination" of"






















development,"many"experiments"have"been"performed"to" test" the"effectiveness"of" various"
design"diversity"and"multiple"version"fault"tolerance"mechanisms;"for"example,"see"[Dahl"and"
Lahti"1979]"and"[Kelly"and"Avizienis"1983]."
Approaches" addressing" fault" tolerance" at" the" requirement" specification" and" design" levels"
include" architectural" approaches"with" or" without" formal" language" specification,"modelling"
techniques"such"as"labelled"transition"systems,"and"model"checking"techniques"to"verify"fault"
tolerance"properties."





into" small," looselyEcoupled" parts" called" concerns," to" deal" with" the" complexity" of" software"
system" [Dijkstra" 1982]." Each" of" these" concerns" is" implemented" using" modularisation"
mechanisms,"and"hence" is"developed,"updated"and"maintained" independent" to"each"other"
and"can"be"reused.""
Fault" tolerance" in" a" software" system"has" the" nature" of" a" crosscutting" concern," as" it" has" a"
global" impact" on" a" system" and" its" functionality" is" scattered" over" the" system" in" several"
components."Like"safety"and"security,"fault"tolerance"concerns"are"nonEfunctional"aspects"of"
the"system"and,"according" to" the"underlying"principles"of"a"separation"of" concerns," can"be"
separated"from"the"functional"aspects"of"the"system.""
In"addition," separation"of" fault" tolerance"concerns"does"not"need" to"be"considered"only"at"






AspectEoriented" software" development" is" a" broad" research" area" that" offers" various" new"
modularisation"mechanisms" for" software" systems" in" order" to" separate" out"multiple" crossE
cutting" concerns" from" the" underlying" base" system." A" small" number" of" aspectEoriented"
software"development"approaches"have"addressed"the"issue"of"fault"tolerance"by"separating"
fault" tolerance" concerns" from" the" base" system." [France" et" al." 2004]" proposed" an" aspectE
oriented" modelling" approach" that" allows" developers" to" conceptualize," describe" and"
communicate"logical"dependability"solutions"in"isolation,"with"the"help"of"an"aspectEoriented"
architecture"model" (AAM)."An" alternative" aspectEoriented"modelling" approach" is" proposed"





communication" and" traceability." It" also" aims" to" make" the" overall" development" process"
simple,"consistent"and"unambiguous"[Pohl"et"al."2006].""
Design" diversity" fault" tolerance" mechanisms" consist" of" different" mandatory" and" optional"
features" such" as" the" selection" of" an" adjudicator" or" the" number" of" variants," etc." These"




In" this" thesis," the" incorporation" of" design" diversity" fault" tolerance" mechanisms" as" an"
orthogonal"concern"is"considered"to"bring"the"same"benefits"as"mentioned"above,"including"




subsequent"composition)stage,"brings"an" increased"difficulty" in"system"comprehension"as" it"
introduces" new" interdependencies" and" interrelationships" between" fault" tolerance" features"
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and" software" components." If" separate" fault" tolerance" concerns" are" integrated" without"
consideration" of" their" relationship," dependency" and" impact" on" other" components," it" can"
potentially"lead"to"undesirable"and"unwanted"feature)interaction"problems.""
1.4( Research(Issues,(Aims(and(Objectives((
The" overall" goal" of" the" thesis" is" to" present" an" orthogonal" fault" tolerance" approach" for"
designing" fault" tolerant" systems," composing" the" orthogonal" components" and" analysing"
potential"undesirable"interactions"arising"from"this"composition."The"primary"purpose"of"this"
orthogonality" is" to" separate" the" fault" tolerance"concern" from"the"main"software"system"to"
make"the"overall"system"consistent,"simple"and"symmetrical."The"orthogonal"fault"tolerance"
approach"has"the"following"objectives:"
• To" provide" a" separation" of" fault" tolerance" concerns" from" the" underlying"
components" of" the" software" system." These" separate" elements" must" be" effective"
when"composed"with"the"components"of"the"existing"system."Hence,"a"composition"
mechanism" provides" the" way" to" compose" fault" tolerance" features" with" the"
components"of"the"existing"system."This"separation"of"concerns"is"expressed"with"an"
orthogonal" view"of" the" system"and" ensures" that" the" adaptation"of" fault" tolerance"
features" can" be" reasoned" about" independently" before" their" composition"with" the"
components"of"the"existing"software"system."
• To"explicitly"deal"with"design"diversity"and"multiple"version"software"fault"tolerance"
mechanisms," including" recovery"block,"NEversion"programming"and"NEself" checking"
programming"mechanisms."
• To" support" reasoning" about" different" fault" tolerance" features" as" well" as" system"
components" before" composition" takes" place" in" terms" of" their" dependency"
relationships"and"constraints."
• To" deal" with" any" potential" undesirable" feature" interactions" that" arise" through" the"
composition" of" fault" tolerance" features" with" the" components" of" the" software"
system." In" the" case" of" such" scenarios," model" checking" can" be" used" to" check" for"




built" preEprocessor" written" in" Lex" &" Yacc." This" preEprocessor" automatically" generates" the"
composition"of" the"orthogonal" fault" tolerance"components," and"also" serves" to"provide" the"
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input" translation" for" the"modelEchecking" tool." CTL" can" be" used" to" verify" properties" of" the"
composed" system" in" conjunction" with" NuSMV" to" analyse" potentially" undesirable" feature"
interactions.""
Finally," the" approach"will" be" evaluated"with" the" help" of" two" case" studies," namely" a" smart"
home" automation" system" and" the" TheracE25" computerEcontrolled" medical" machine" for"
radiation" therapy." In" TheracE25," the" difference" between" reliability" and" safety" becomes"
apparent." The" generation" of" early" Therac" machines," ones" preceding" the" TheracE25," were"
deemed"to"be"safe"even"though"some"of"the"same"software"defects"existed:"safety"threats"
were" averted"by" a"hardware" interlock" system."Hence,"when" the" failures"occurred" they"did"
not"escalate"into"accidents"such"as"injury"or"death,"i.e."the"system"was"safe"but"not"reliable.""
1.5( Novel(Contributions(





coEexist" in" a" software" system." The" proposed" Orthogonal" Fault" Tolerance" (OFT)"










The" proposed" approach" explicitly" deals"with" the" problem"of" any" potential" undesirable"








Chapter" 2:" Introduces" and" discusses" the" related" work" from" the" literature" in" detail." In"
particular," work" related" to" architectural" fault" tolerance," formal" methods" approaches" to"
composition,"aspectEoriented"development"considering"separation"of"crossEcutting"concerns"
and"feature"interaction"handling"techniques"are"considered.""
Chapter" 3:" An" overview" of" the" proposed" Orthogonal" Fault" Tolerance" (OFT)" framework"
approach" is" presented" in" chapter" 3" with" detailed"methodology" and" supporting" tools." This"
chapter"outlines"the"formalisms"used"in"the"composition"of"fault"tolerance"with"the"system"
and"the"methodology"to"deal"with"the"interactions.""
Chapter" 4:" This" chapter" illustrates" the"methodology" and" formalisms"with" the"worked" case"
study"of"a"home"automation"system."This"chapter"further"illustrates"how"undesirable"feature"
interactions" may" arise" from" the" composition" of" fault" tolerance" with" the" components" of"
underlying"Home"Automation"system.""
Chapter" 5:" In" this" chapter," the" methodology" is" applied" to" the" historically" significant" case"
study" of" the" TheracE25" computer" controlled" medical" machine" for" radiotherapy." This" case"








1" and" evaluating" to" what" extent" they" have" been" achieved." The" shortcomings," future"














with" the" software," and" the" issues" that"arise" from" this" composition" such"as" complexity"and"
potential"undesirable"feature" interactions." "This"chapter"outlines"the"research"in"support"of"
introducing" fault" tolerance"mechanisms"at" the" requirement"specification"and"design" levels,"
and"dealing"with"composition"and"feature"interactions."It"also"identifies"the"gap"in"the"state"
of" the" art" and" a" research" agenda,"which" introduces" the" framework" for" the" fault" tolerance"
composition" and" analysis" of" feature" interactions." In" order" to"make" a" comparison" between"
different"approaches,"surveyed"approaches"are"broken"down"into"the"following"areas:""
• Fault(Tolerance(at(Requirement(Specification(and(Design(Levels:"These"approaches"
address" fault" tolerance" at" the" initial" phases" of" software" development," such" as"
specification,"design"and"architecture"levels."
• Fault( tolerance( Composition:" These" approaches" have" composition" specific"
mechanisms"to"integrate"different"components"of"the"software"system."
• Feature( Interaction(Analysis:" These"approaches"have" the" capability" to"analyse"and"
detect"undesirable"feature"interactions.""





of" the"system."Examples" in" terms"of"modelling"are"UML,"statecharts," finite"state"machines,"
formal"methods,"temporal"logic"and"UML"sequence"diagrams.""






concerns." Different" approaches" address" this" separation" differently," for" example" by"
addressing" it" at" a" semantic" or" syntax" level," or" in" case" of" fault" tolerance" by" differentiating"
between" normal" and" abnormal" behaviour." Some" approaches" address" this" separation" by"
designing"functional"components"and"nonIfunctional"features"separately.""
Feature( Interaction( Analysis:" According" to" this" characteristic," after" composing" fault"
tolerance"mechanisms"with" the" system’s" components," there" is" a"need" to"analyse"potential"
undesirable"feature"interaction"that"may"lead"the"system"into"an"inconsistent"or"error"state.""
Platform( and( Paradigm( dependencies:" This" characteristic" focuses" on" any" platform" and"
paradigm" constraints" used" by" the" different" approaches." These" constraints" can" be"
programming" languages" like" C," Java," C++," etc." or" can" be" operating" systems" like" UNIX,"
GNU/Linux,"Windows,"etc.""
Supporting( tools( and( examples/( case( studies:" This" characteristic" considers" the" supportive"
tool(s)" used" by" each" approach." Furthermore," it" briefly" describes" the" examples" and" case"
studies"used"to"demonstrate"the"approach.""
Firstly," each" approach" is" presented" with" the" specified" characteristics" presented" above."
Following" this," a" comparison" will" be" made" based" on" the" characteristics" that" match" the"














and" analysing" fault" tolerant" software" systems" built" from" commercial" offItheIshelf" (COTS)"
components," considered" as" a" black" box." The" coIoperative" architectural" style" offers" the"
means"to"structure"the"complex"applications"and"provides"a"way"to"add"exception"handling"
fault" tolerance" mechanism" to" untrustworthy" components." In" a" coIoperative" style" of"
architecture," the" abstraction" is" provided" in" the" form" of" ‘connectors’" that" capture" the"
collaborative" behaviour" between" the" architectural" components." Components" embody"
computation," whereas," connectors" are" mediating" interactions" between" the" architectural"
components." These" connectors" are" used" to" limit" the" impact" of" the" change" to" the" overall"
system" architecture." In" this" approach," system" exceptions" are" handled" at" the" component"
level,"providing"dependability" from"the"untrustworthy"components." The"approach"uses" the"
UPPAAL"model"checker"and"timed"automata"to"analyse"the"normal"and"abnormal"behaviour"
of"the"coIoperative"architecture.""
Similar" to" the" [deLemos" 2001]" approach," [Issarny" and" Banatre" 2001]" present" the"
implementation" of" exception" handling" within" the" components" and" connectors" and" at" the"
level" of" architectural" configuration." Components" and" connectors" can" raise" exceptions."
Exception"handling"within"components"and"connectors"handles"exceptions" internally"to"the"
specific"component"or"connector"and"has"no"impact"on"the"rest"of"the"architecture.""
System( Model:" These" approaches" are" architecture" centric," where" components" and"
connectors" are" used" to" describe" normal" and" exceptional" (abnormal)" behaviour" of" the"
component."Components" support" the" representation"of" structural"and"behavioural"aspects"
of"a"system."Structural"behaviour"of"component"is"described"by"name,"attributes,"description"
of" structure" such" as" composedIof," and" intraIrelations" between" different" components."
Similarly," the" behaviour" aspect" of" the" component" identifies" the" port" of" the" component,"
normal," exceptional" and" failure" behaviour" of" the" component." CoIoperative" connectors"
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encapsulate" the" collaborative" activity" between" the" several" components." The" behaviour" of"
the"connectors"use"preIconditions"and"postIconditions"to"start"and"finish"a"certain"activity.""
Fault( Tolerance( Expressiveness:" These" approaches" deal" with" the" exception" handling" that"
uses"a"forward"error"recovery"mechanism"to"bring"the"system"into"a"new"or"errorIfree"state."
For" the" illustration" of" exceptional" behaviour," a" handler" defines" its" start" and" finish" event"
based"on"pre"and"post"conditions."It"also"deals"with"two"types"of"failure"behaviours:"failure"of"
omission" and" the" failure" of" commission." The" exceptional" behaviour" of" a" connector" is"




behaviour" of" connectors" is" represented" by" timed" automata" with" data" variables." The"
exceptional"signal"is"raised"with"the"occurrence"of"the"exceptional"behaviour"when"the"pre"or"
post"condition"for"the"collaborative"operation"is"not"true."This" invokes"the"execution"of"the"
exception" handler," and" the" coIoperation" is" finished" assuming" that" the" postIcondition" for"
exception"behaviour"is"true."
Composition( Mechanism:" The" incorporation" of" an" exception" handling" fault" tolerance"
mechanism" can" be" done"with" the" coIoperative" architectural" styles" using" components" and"
connectors." The" architectural" connectors" are" used" to" add" or" change" the" behaviour" of"
untrustworthy" COTS" components" to" build" the" dependable" component." In" this" approach,"
connectors" are" considered" as" first" class" entities" that" describe" the" collaborative" behaviour,"
which"provides"the"basis"for"implementing"error"recovery"in"the"presence"of"faults."
Feature( Interaction( Analysis:" The" interactions" between" the" components" are" dealt" with"
through"the"help"of"coIoperative"style"connectors"by"identifying"the"normal,"exceptional"and"
failure" behaviours." This" approach" however," does" not" address" the" feature" interactions"
between" the" components" specifically," and" does" not" deal" with" undesirable" interactions." In"
this" approach," in" fact" the" interactions" between"different" components" are" carried" out"with"
the" help" of" connectors" to" overcome" the" problem" of" architectural" mismatch" as" COTS"
components" are" used" for" building" the" dependable" components." Also," the" interactions" are"
explicitly" addressed" at" a" configuration" level" rather" than" at" the" component" level." In" a" coI






and" timed" automata"with" extended" data" variables." The" approach" is" demonstrated" on" Self"
Gas"service"and"VSI40X"sounding"rocket"case"studies"[deLemos"2001]."Whereas,"Issarny"and"
Banatre’s" approach" uses" the" Aster" framework" [Issarny" and" Banatre" 2001]" to" provide" an"
implementation"for"configuration"level"exception"handling.""
2.2.2( iFTC((idealized(Fault(Tolerant(Component)(
[Guerra" et" al." 2002]" present" the" C2" style" architecture" for" an" idealized" fault" tolerant"
component" architecture" model" (IFTCM)," separating" normal" and" abnormal" activity" and"
introducing"specialised"C2"connectors."The"iC2C"style"[deLemos"2001]"is"used"to"produce"an"
iCOTS" protective" wrapping" for" the" components" and" provides" an" application" specific" fault"
tolerance"capability."A"similar"approach"is"presented"in"[Brito"et"al."2009]"where"architectural"
abstractions"are"used"for"building"fault"tolerant"element"(iFTElement),"and"can"be"seen"as"an"




2005]" and" [Brito" et" al." 2005]." These" approaches" define" the" exception" behaviour," and"
separate"the"normal"and"abnormal"behaviours"using"UML"sequence"and"activity"diagrams"at"
the" architectural" level." The" process" algebra" CSP" is" used" to" give" the" semantics" of" UML"
sequence"diagrams,"whereas"the"BImethod"is"used"for"the"semantics"of"UML"entities.""













component" that" may" be" corrected," allowing" the" operation" to" be" completed" successfully;"
otherwise,"they"are"propagated"as"external"exceptions""




communication"between" components." An" idealized" fault" tolerant" component" encapsulates"
the"normal"and"abnormal"behaviour"inside"it."Furthermore,"idealised"C2"components"can"be"
integrated" into" any" C2" configurations" with" this" C2" architectural" style." This" composition"
provides" loose" coupling" between" components" as" these" components" may" be" completely"
unaware" of" each" other," especially" when" one" integrates" various" commercial" offItheIshelf"
components"(COTS),"which"may"have"heterogeneous"style"and"implementation"language.""
Feature( Interaction( Analysis:" Idealised" fault" tolerant" components" are" integrated" together"
with"C2"style"architecture,"thus"allowing"the"interaction"of"iC2Cs"with"other"idealized"and/or"
regular" C2" components." This" interaction" is" for" the" communication" between" different"
components."There"is"no"mechanism"to"analyse"feature"interaction.""
Platform/paradigm( constraint:" As" the" approach" works" at" the" design" and"modelling" level,"
there" is" no" discussion" about" platform"dependency."However," this" approach" targets" critical"
component"base"systems"and"service"oriented"legacy"architectures."""





The"work"of" [Parchas"2004]"demonstrates" that" the"applicationIindependent" fault" tolerance"
techniques"can"be"integrated"in"the"architectures"via"a"pattern."This"approach"is"mainly"used"
for" web" based" services." The" services" are" developed" independently" by" different" service"
providers" and" composed"using"patterns."A" comparator"provides" semantics" for" similarity"or"
dissimilarity" of" different" services." A" pattern" for" improving" web" services" availability" and"
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dynamic" reconfiguration" is" proposed." It" also" addresses" the" dynamic" composition" of" web"
services."
This"approach"deals"with"the"fault"tolerant"redundant"components"for"self"checking"pairs"and"
architecture" reconfiguration." The" composition" mechanism" for" incorporation" of" fault"
tolerance" is" via" a" pattern." The" approach" is" based" on" diversity" of" different" sources" of"
information,"comparator"and"bridges.""
System(Model:" This" approach" uses" architectural" patterns," where" the" main" elements" are:"
bridge," comparator," service" broker" and" FTIregistry" [Parchas" 2004]." " These" architectural"
patterns" are" used" for" the" elimination" of" mismatches" between" the" required" and" provided"
services,"and"the"provision"and"management"of" redundancies."These"architectural"patterns"




checking"pairs," dealing"with" any" kind"of"mismatch" faults." An" applicationIindependent" fault"
tolerant" technique" can" be" easily" incorporated" in" architectural" modelling" such" as" multiI
versioning" derived" from" the" notion" of" NIversion" programming" (NVP)." The" architectural"
pattern"in"this"approach"resembles"the"NIself"checking"fault"tolerance"mechanism"but"does"
not" employ" two" levels" of" comparison" as" it" does" not" deal" with" the" design" faults." " These"
patterns" only" deal" with" the" structure" of" components," not" their" behaviour." Hence," these"
patterns" are" mainly" suitable" for" the" comparator" element" such" as" the" self" checking"




Separation( of( Concerns:" The" comparator" provides" the" similarity" and" dissimilarity" in" the"
semantics" of" different" data" coming" from" distinct" bridges." It" monitors" the" behaviour" of"
connected" bridges" and" their" internal" behaviour." Although" all" architectural" patterns" are"
syntactically"separated"and"specific"to"the"certain"element"of"the"base"model," they"are"not"
reusable."Moreover,"with" these" architectural" patterns," separation" of" concerns"may" not" be"
directly" applicable" considering" the" fact" that" fault" tolerance" and" fault" intrusion" are"
interrelated" at" an" architectural" level." However," these" patterns" are" described" in" pattern"
languages" that" are" not" rigorously" defined" and" therefore" are" not" amenable" as" needed" for"
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their" identification"associated"with"a"particular" style." Furthermore," there" is"no"way" to"deal"
with"dependability"when"using"heterogeneous"style"of"architecture"patterns""
"






Platform/paradigm( constraint:" The" approach" is" not" platform" dependent" but" explicitly"
designed"for"the"web"based"services.""
Tool( Support/Case( Studies:( The" approach" does" not" provide" any" tool" support." Nor" is" it"
demonstrated"on"any"case"study."""
2.2.4( MAL(Specification(
In" particular," a" small" number" of" approaches" use" formal" language" specification" for" the"
development"of" fault" tolerant" systems." [Magee"and"Maibaum"2006]"use" the"Modal"Action"
Logic"(MAL)"specification"language"for"specifying"normal"and"abnormal"states"and"behaviour"
of"components."The"component"is"described"with"its"attributes,"actions"and"axioms."The"MAL"






abnormal" behaviour," providing" the" specification" for" self" healing" and" self" checking" fault"
tolerance"mechanisms."""
System( Model:" The" specification" used" in" this" approach" is" component" based." The" key"
elements"for"fault"tolerance"representation"include"the"description"of"component"behaviour,"
interaction"mechanisms"such"as"connectors"and"coordination,"configuration"(with"behaviour"




specifications" use" deontic" operators" (actions" being" obliged," permitted" or" forbidden)." The"
semantics" of" these"operators" provide" an" explicit" distinction"between" the" ‘good’" or" normal"
behaviour" and" abnormal" or" ‘bad’" behaviour." In" the" case" of" normative" behaviour," good"
actions"are"executed"and"lead"from"good"states"to"good"states."In"contrast,"bad"actions"lead"
to" the"bad" states"where" recovery" is" required" to" reIenter"a"normative"behaviour"mode."On"
the"occurrence"of"bad"behaviour,"self"healing"recovery"actions"are"specified."""
Fault(Tolerance(Expressiveness:(MAL"specification"deals"with"the"selfIchecking/"selfIhealing"
fault" tolerance" mechanism" with" the" help" of" fault" tolerance" models" to" demonstrate" the"
effectiveness" of" the" mechanism." The" self" healing" property" of" the" system" is" based" on" the"
‘good’" and" ‘bad’" states" and" their" sub" division" to" know:" if" nothing" bad" happens," then"
eventually" normative" behaviour" is" resumed." In" some" situations," normative" behaviour" is"
replaced"by"some"appropriate"fault"tolerance"model"such"as"forward"recovery."The"Authors"




abnormal" behaviour." However," this" approach" does" not" provide" separate" fault" tolerance"
models"for"the"system"recovery,"as"good"and"bad"states"coIexist"within"the"component.""
Composition(Mechanism:( There" is" no" explicit" definition" of" composition" of" fault" tolerance"
with"components"of"the"system.""




Platform/paradigm( constraint:" The" approach" is" neither" platform"dependent," nor" designed"
for"any"particular"paradigm."
Tool(Support/Case(Studies:(The"approach"uses"MAL"specification"and"LTSA"model"checking"







exceptions" flow" between" architectural" elements." ArchitectureIbased" development" with"
Aereal" starts" with" the" requirements" analysis" and" architectural" design" of" the" system." The"
scenarios"where"system"may"fail"or"fault"models"are"defined"with"the"associated"exceptions"
for"each" type"of"error"and"exception"handling"activity." These"activities"provide" results" that"
show"a"description"of" the"system’s"architecture"and"their" informal"specifications." It" further"
gives"the"fault"model"of"the"system"and"exceptional"activity"if"any.""
The"approach"integrates"ACME,"an"architectural"description"language,"for"the"specification"of"
exceptional" information," and" uses" Alloy," a" first" order" relational" language," to" check" the"
properties."The"exceptional"flows"between"different"elements"are"captured"in"an"Exception"
Flow" Model" which" allows" the" specification" of" common" rules" of" exception" handling" in"
software"systems.""
System(Model:"Exception"flow"between"architectural"elements"is"specified"with"the"help"of"a"





architectural" description" violates" any" of" the" exception" constraints" based" on" the" Alloy"
specification.""





Separation( of( Concerns:" In" the" ACME" specification," the" architectural" organisation" and"
separation" between" normal" views," normal" architectural" styles" and" normal" connectors" and"






the" latter," generating"an"Alloy" specification"model." Exception" flow"views"can"be"composed"
with"the"same"architecture"using"the"default"semantic"‘union’.""
Feature( Interaction(Analysis:"There" is"no"explicit"mechanism"to"analyse"feature" interaction"
for" fault" tolerant" components." However," the" two" separate" design" artefacts" address" the"
interactions"within"the"architectural"styles"and"the"exception"styles.""





In" [Guelfi"et"al."2004],"an"approach" is"presented" that"use"MDE" (Model"Driven"Engineering)"
process," UML" based" notation" and"MDA" (Model" Driven" Architecture)" concepts" " to" support"
stepIwise" development" of" fault" tolerant" distributed" systems," aiming" to" span" design" and"
implementation" through" generative" methods." DRIP" (Dependable" Remote" Interacting"
Process)" is"a"framework"specific"MDE/MDA"method,"by"combining"modelIdriven"generative"
and" formal" techniques." In" this" approach," Coordinated"Atomic" Actions" (CAA)" are" used"with"
the"DRIP"Catalyst"development"method"to"support"backward"and"forward"error"recovery"in"
distributed" systems." It" is" called" DRIP" Catalyst," as" it" uses" combination" of"MDE," UMLIbased"
notation,"MDA"tool"and"formal"techniques.""
System(Model:"This"approach"is"architecture"centric,"and"a"UMLIbased"language"is"used"for"
the" formal" description" of" fault" tolerance" properties," using" Java" classes." CAAs" (Coordinated"
Atomic"Actions)"are"represented"by"UML"activity"diagrams"that"are"very"close"to"Java"syntax;"
this" allows" the" automatic" transformation" of" the" UML"model" to" generated" code." CAAs" are"
built"using" the"profile"of" specific"design"models."However," there" is"no"general"notation" for"
platformIindependentIdesign"models.""
Fault( Tolerance( Expressiveness:" Coordinated" atomic" actions" (CAAs)" are" used" to" address"
error" recovery" techniques" and" the" combination" of" distributed" transactions" and" atomic"
actions," and" are" applicable" for" both" forward" error" recovery" and" backward" error" recovery."
Forward"error"recovery"relies"on"exception"handling"that"transforms"the"system"component"





Separation( of( Concerns:" CAAs" are" designed" as" a" set" of" roles" cooperating" inside" each"




Composition( Mechanism:" The" incorporation" of" fault" tolerance" is" done" within" the"
architectural" Coordinated" Atomic" Actions." The" CAAs" are" a" unified" scheme" for" supporting"
error" recovery" between" interacting" components." Hence," there" is" no" orthogonal" fault"
tolerance"rather" it" is"embedded" in"the"component"and" is"automatically" transformed"to"the"
code"level.""
Feature(Interaction(Analysis:"This"approach"does"not"verify"any"fault"tolerance"properties"of"
their" application," before" generating" the" code." Hence," there" is" no" assurance" for" the"
consistency" between" the" verified" model" and" the" generated" code." Moreover," there" is" no"










centric" approach" allows" making" a" smooth" transition" from" the" architecturalIlevel" system"
modelling" to" specification" and" refinement" of" each"particular" component" by" using" Event"B."
Event"B"is"a"state"based"formal"approach"and"its"formalism"is"considered"as"an"extension"of"B"
method." The" approach" uses" patterns" to" describe" the" module" interface," which" can" be"
instantiated" by" componentIspecific" data" and" behaviour" during" system" refinement."
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Moreover," the" proposed" refinementIbased" development" techniques" have" coped"well"with"
modelling"the"complex"mode"transition"scheme"and"verification"of"its"correctness."
System(Model:"The"textual"Event"B"language"is"used"for"modelling"purposes,"describing"a"set"
of"variables," their" initial" states,"guarded" transitions"and"other" invariants." "Modelling" is"also"
carried"out"with"UML"interface"modules"and"graphical"syntax"of"Event"B.""Event"B"also"uses"
model" checker" ProB" to" verify" the" formalism." Rodin" supportive" tool" can" be" used" for" the"
mathematical"proofs."""
Fault( Tolerance( Expressiveness:" This" approach" does" not" deal" with" any" specific" fault"
tolerance" mechanisms," nor" does" it" handle" any" particular" faults." However," dependability"




Separation( of( Concerns:" This" approach" does" not" deal" with" fault" tolerance" as" a" separate"
concern" or" provide" any" fault" semantics." There" is" no" orthogonal" fault" tolerance" rather" it" is"
separated" by" parameterisation" and" instantiation" multiple" times" within" the" modules." The"
incorporation"of"fault"tolerance"can"be"done"with"the"help"of"patterns"in"modules"that"split"
components"into"module"interfaces"and"module"bodies."
Composition(Mechanism:" The" parallel" composition"with"multiple" assignments" is" used" and"
satisfies" the" property" of" compositionality" in" the" context" of" modules" that" describe" as"
machines.""
Feature( Interaction( Analysis:" There" is" no" explicit" mechanism" for" identifying," detecting" or"
analysing"feature"interactions"between"different"components.""
Platform/paradigm( constraint:" The" approach" can" be" used" with" ADA," C" and" Java" and"
specialised"for"event"based"reactive"systems.""
Tool( Support/Case( Studies:( The" approach" is" applied" on" a" liquid" handling" work" station"
Fillwell.""Atelier"B"automatic"supportive"tool"for"Event"B"is"used"[FillwellTM"2002].""
2.2.8( Other(Approaches(
Some" other" formal" verification" techniques" have" been" proposed" to" address" the" fault"




mechanisms" to"baseline" systems." They" concluded" that" reIexecution"was" the"most"efficient"
mechanism," followed" by" parity" code," dual" modular" redundancy" and" triple" modular"
redundancy."They"also"presented" the" ratio"of" verification"effort"and" testing"effort" to"assist"
designers" in" their" tradeIoff" analysis" when" deciding" how" to" allocate" their" budget" between"
formal"verification"and"testing"and"can"be"used"in"practical" industrial"production."[Yeung"et"
al." 2003]" proposed" the"CSP" approach"using" FDR2" to" formally" verify" both" the" faultItolerant"
software"and"hardware"design."Their"work"mostly"focused"on"the"implementation"level"using"
ProB"and"the"JCSP"programming"environment"[Welch"and"Martin"2000].""
In" [Tomoyuki" et" al." 2001]," the" authors" proposed" a" symbolic"model" checking"method"using"
SMV" with" CTL" [Clarke," Grumberg" and" Peled" 1999]" " formula" for" the" verification" of" fault"
tolerance" of" systems." [Lanfang" et" al." 2012]" proposed" a" similar" approach" for" formal"
verification" of" signatureImonitoring" mechanisms" by" model" checking" using" operational"
semantics" and" model" checking" NuSMV" [NuSMV]." In" contrast," [Daniel" and" Ruben" 2005]"
present"the"idea"of"using"an"aspectIoriented"approach"to"add"fault"tolerance"to"software"and"
then" the" formalism" can" be" applied" to" the" resulting" separation" of" the" fault" tolerance" code"
from" the" function" code." [Clarke," Grumberg" and" Peled" 1999]" describe" four" kinds" of" fault"
tolerant" abstraction," namely" faults," faultImasking," voting" and" communications." These"
abstractions" are" then" formalised" and" verified." [Kulkarni" et" al." 2005]" propose" a" similar"
approach" but" mainly" focus" on" the" synthesis" of" fault" tolerant" system" according" to" the"
algorithms"which"are"mechanically"verified"by"using"PVS"theorem"[Owre"et"al."1996]."
The"work"of" [Keinzle"et" al." 2005]"presents"a" requirements"engineering"process" to" consider"
reliability"and" safety"at"early"phases"of" software"development"process."This"approach"uses"
the" concept" of" idealized" fault" tolerant" components" with" the" addition" of" Dependability"
Oriented" Requirement" Engineering" Process" (DREP)." DREP" extends" traditional" use" case"
modelling"to"consider"reliability"and"safety"concerns.""
The" above" approaches" use" formalisms" for" the" automatic" verification" of" fault" tolerance"
properties"at"the"initial"phases"of"software"development"such"as"requirements"specification"
and"design" level." The" approach"of"Daniel" and"Ruben"explicitly" addresses" the" separation"of"












in" tabular" form" in"Table"2.1."The"table"serves"as"a"quick"way"to" filter"out" the"most"desired"



































































































There# are#many# excellent# survey# papers# on# Aspect6Oriented# techniques,# including# aspect6






[France# et# al.# 2004]# proposed# an# aspect6oriented# modelling# (AOM)# approach# that# allows#
developers# to# conceptualise,# describe# and# communicate# logical# dependability# solutions# in#
isolation# with# the# help# of# an# aspect6oriented# architecture#model# (AAM).# This# architecture#
consists# of# a# set# of# aspect# models# and# a# base# architecture.# An# integrated# view# of# the#
architecture#is#obtained#by#composing#the#aspect#and#base#architecture#models#to#produce#a#
composed# AAM#with# the# help# of# Templates# and# UML#models# such# as# class# diagrams# and#
sequence#diagrams.#Aspects#describe# solutions# in# this#approach# that# crosscut#UML#module#
views#and#may# specify# concepts# that#are#not#present# in#a#base#model.# The#AAM#approach#
provides#support#for#the#separation#of#crosscutting#concerns#such#as#dependability#and#also#
supports#composition#of#aspect#and#model#views#using#a##composition#strategy.#Later,#a#tool#





separation# of# concerns# through# the# use# of# different# diagram# types# that# can# be# used# to#
describe#non6orthogonal#views#of#a#system.##












integrating# aspect# and# primary#models.# Similar# to# the# composition# procedure,# the# feature#
interaction# analysis# requires# further# effort# on# the# part# of# the# developers# but# the# Model#
Analysis#component# is# somehow#responsible# for#analysing# the#composed#model# to# identify#
errors#and#to#determine#the#extent#that#dependability#objectives#are#met.##
Platform/paradigm$ constraint:# The# approach# is# not# constrained# to# a# particular# platform#
except#the#use#of#UML.##
Tool$ Support/Case$ Studies:# A# composition# tool,# Kompose/composer# [Fleurey# et# al.# 2008],#








[Clark# et# al.# 2001],#with# the#design#unit# named#Theme.# The#base# theme#unit# refers# to# the#
base# system# and# the# aspect# theme# refers# to# the# crosscutting# aspect# as# well# as# any# other#
behaviour#that#is#triggered#by#behaviour#in#some#other#theme.#Modelling#of#the#base#theme#
is# carried# out# in#UML# design# process,#whereas# aspect# themes# are#modelled#with# different#
modularisation# packages.# The# modularisation# of# the# aspect# theme# is# similar# to# the# UML#
models# where# the# structural# view# is# represented# with# the# help# of# class# diagrams# and#
behavioural#views#is#represented#with#the#help#of#sequence#diagrams.##
System$ Model:# At# the# requirement# analysis# phase,# this# approach# uses# Theme/Doc# that#
provides#views#whereas,#at#the#design#phase,#the#approach#uses#Theme/UML:#standard#UML#
modelling# with# class# diagrams# using# stereotypes,# UML# sequence# diagrams# to# show# the#
structural#and#behavioural#view#of#the#base#theme#unit,#and#the#aspect#theme#unit.#Action#
views#in#the#requirements#document#are#used#to#identify#the#crosscutting#behaviours.#Each#
action# is# designed# separately# with# Theme/UML.# Theme/UML# is# designed# as# a# platform6
29#
#
independent# approach# and#provides#mappings# to#AspectJ.# Basically,# Theme/UML#poses# no#





at# the# requirement# and# design# level.# In# Theme/UML,# first# all# non6crosscutting# themes# are#
composed#and#then#crosscutting#themes#are#woven#one#after#the#other#into#the#composed#
model,#thus#forcing#the#developer#to#consider#the#ordering#of#crosscutting#themes.##
Feature$ Interaction$ Analysis:# The# UML# class# relationship# is# used# to# model# interactions#
between#different#concerns,#but#these#are#not#related#to#undesirable#feature# interaction# in#
anyway.##










In# [Cottenier# et# al.# 2007],# a# tool# is# developed# known# as#Motorola#WEAVER# based# on# SDL,#
designed# for# UML# Statecharts# that# include# action# semantics.# It# supports# the# automatic#
generation# of# source# code# and# platform6specific# models# by# weaving# aspects# into# the#
executable#UML#models.#Two#main#constructs#are#used#by#Motorola#WEAVER:# ‘where’#and#








using# metamodels.# Crosscutting# behaviour# is# designed# with# Specification# and# Description#
Language#(SDL)#state#charts.#There#are#two#kinds#of# jointpoints,#action# jointpoints#are#used#
for# the# actions# and# calls# construction# whereas# transition# jointpoints# are# used# for# the#




System$Model:# This# approach#uses#UML#Statecharts# that# include#action# semantics.# Special#
constructs#using#stereotypes#describe#the#pointcuts#and#connectors#representing#jointpoints#
and#advice.#Pointcuts#and#connectors#are#encapsulated#by#a#special#construct#aspect.#Finite#
state#machines# are# also# used# to# show# the# behaviour# specifications# of# the# components.# A#
special#<<bind>>#stereotype#defines#which#pointcuts#needs#to#bind#with#which#pointcut#and#
similarly#for#the#connectors.##
Composition$ Mechanism:$ In# the# Motorola# WEAVER,# there# are# three# categories# for# the#
composition# mechanism:# pointcut# composition,# connector# composition# and# aspect#
composition.# For# the# pointcut# composition,# Boolean# operators# (and,# or,# not)# are# used.# In#
connector# composition,# the# precedence# relationship# is# considered# and# the# <<follows>>#
stereotype# is# used# to# compose# the# connectors# with# joinpoints.# Deployment# diagrams# are#
used#for#the#aspect#composition#that#binds#the#aspect#with#the#base#model.##
Feature$ Interaction$ Analysis:# The# WEAVER# approach# explicitly# specifies# the# precedence#
constraints# for# the# pointcuts# and# connectors# that# can# help# reduce# the# undesirable#
interference# at# the# same# jointpoints.# Moreover,# dependability# is# also# considered# and# the#
developer#of#one#aspect#must#be#aware#of#all#potentially#conflicting#aspects,#address#conflicts#






Tool$ Support/Case$ Studies:# The# Tau# tool# provides# a# model# explorer# that# supports# the#
detailed# analysis# of# models# written# in# C/C++.# The# approach# is# illustrated# through# two#
examples#of#resource#server;#transaction#timeout#aspect#and#two#phase#commit#aspect.##
2.3.4$AspectJ$for$Exception$Handling$
Several# works# also# take# an# aspect6oriented# approach# to# fault# tolerance# and# exception#
handling# concerns# at# the# implementation# level# such# as# [Filho# et# al.# 2005].# This# approach#
works# on# the# modularigin# the# exception# handling# with# the# help# of# AspectJ.# AspectJ# is#






concerns.# Three# matrices# are# used# for# this# purpose,# namely# concern# diffusion# over#




catch6finally’,# and# ‘try6finally’# blocks# of# the# Java# code# are# modularised# in# aspects.# These#
aspects#are#implemented#with#before,#after#and#around#advice,#depending#on#the#execution#
of#the#handler.#Aspects#to#handle#exceptions#are#defined#for#each#class# in#the#base#system.#
The# advice# is# expressed# in# terms# of# pointcuts# and# join# points,# which# describes# precisely#
where# the# additional# behaviour# should# be# added,# e.g.# before,# after# or# around# existing#
methods.####
Composition$ Mechanism:$ Composition# of# aspect# is# carried# out# with# the# help# of# process#
called# weaving# in# which# java# classes# represent# aspects.# Weaver# tool# is# used# to# perform#
weaving#between#aspects.###
Feature$ Interaction$ Analysis:# The# approach# does# not# address# the# issues# of# feature#





oriented# programming# language# such# as# Java,# C## and# C++# and# normally# considered# as#
application#specific.##
Tool$Support/Case$Studies:$Telestrada’s#Complaint#Management#Subsystem#(CMS)# is#taken#
as# a# case# study# for# this# approach# consisting# of#more# than# 12000# LOC# and#more# than# 300#
classes.##





reason# about# semantic# influences# and# trade6offs# among# aspects.# The# approach# uses# a#
Requirements#Description#Language#(RDL)#based#on#the#semantic#information#of#the#natural#
language.# Composition# specifications# in# this# approach# are# based# on# the# requirement#
specification# semantics# that# also# address# the# reasoning# about# composition# of# aspects# and#
trade6offs.#The#approach#is#applied#on#two#case#studies#and#supported#by#the#MRAT#tool.##
In# the# AOM# approach# proposed# by# [Clarke# and#Walker,# 2001][Clarke# and#Walker,# 2002]# a#
design#concern,#called#a#Subject,# is# created# for#each#system#requirement#and#presented#as#
UML#model#views.#Composition# relationships#are# supported#by#UML#metamodels# that#also#
describe#rules#for#composition.#Merge#and#override#operations#are#used#for#the#integration.#


























































The# problem#of# detecting# and# analysing# undesirable# interactions# is# a#well9researched# area#
and,# in# the# particular# domain# of# telecommunications# systems,# research# into# feature#
interaction#has#a#long#history#dating#back#to#the#1990s.#Comprehensive#surveys#exist#for#this#





[Nakamura# and# Kikuno# 2000]# present# an# approach# for# feature# interaction# filtering.# The#
approach#works#at# the#requirement#specification# level# to# identify#all#possible#combinations#
that#have#the#possibility#of#feature#interaction.#The#filtering#method#screens#out#undesirable#
feature# combinations# before# the# detection# process.# The# method# is# supported# by# a#
requirement# notation# called# Use# Case# Maps# (UCMs)# based# on# scenario# paths,# for# the#
description#of#services#associated#with#the#UCM#Navigator.##
In#this#approach,#each#feature#is#expressed#as#a#set#of#submaps#describing#scenarios#specific#
to# the# feature.# The# rootmap# describes# the# common# scenarios# with# default# submaps,# into#
which# the# feature# submaps# are# plugged.# Then# the# information# about# feature# submap#
plugging# is# provided# in# a# stub# configuration# represented# in# terms# of# a# matrix,# called# the#
configuration#matrix.#Once#each#configuration#matrix#has#been#characterised,#composition#of#
different# configurations# is# carried# out# by# a# matrix# composition# operator# based# on# the#
semantics#of#the#composition.##
System$Model:#This#approach#uses#the#Use#Case#Maps#(UCMs)#requirements#notation.#UCMs#









Separation$ of$ Concerns:# Each# feature# and# configuration# is# considered# separately,# hence#
addressing#separation#of#concerns.#
Feature$ Interaction$ Analysis:# The# approach# addresses# the# problem# of# analysis# of# feature#
interactions# before# detection# takes# place.# FI9prone# combinations# can# be# identified# but# for#
the#FI#detection,#there#is#still#the#need#to#employ#more#formal#definitions#and#techniques.##







[Kimbler# and# Sobirk# 1994]# present# the# FIN# detection# method# based# on# Use# Case# Driven#
Analysis# of# a# system#at# the# requirement# specification# level.# There# are# two#models# derived#
from#the#informal#description#of#services#and#feature.#The#first#model#is#use#case#model#that#
describes#the#users#and#services#associated#with#these#users#in#use#case.#The#other#model#is#
called# service# usage#model# that# captures# the# dynamic# dependencies# between# the# services#
and#their#features.#These#dependencies#can#further#work#out#with#the#help#of#service#usage#
graphs.#All#possible#scenarios#can#be#generated#from#the#Service#Usage#Model.#
The# feature# detection# starts# from# the# scenarios# generated# from# the# service# usage#model.#
This# model# provides# the# feature# sequence# that# can# be# used# in# the# identification# of#
interactions.#Similarly,# [Felty#et#al.#2000]#also#use# the#FIN# tool#aided#by# the#model# checker#
COSPAN# to# check# inconsistency# between# service# features.# This# approach# uses# formal#
methods# to# automatically# detect# undesirable# feature# interaction# by# using# linear# temporal#
logic#(LTL)#at#the#specification#stage.#
System$Model:#This#approach#uses#Use#Case#Driven#Analysis#at#the#requirement#specification#
level# to#analyse#all#possible#scenarios#of# the#system#with# the#help#of#Use#Case#Models#and#
Service#Usage#Models#(SUM).#SUMs#describe#all#possible#scenarios#and#automatically#analyse#








Feature$ Interaction$ Analysis:# The# FIN# detection# method# fully# addresses# the# problem# of#
analysis#and#detection#of#feature# interactions#with#the#help#of#the#automated#tool#and#Use#
Case#Driven#Requirement#specifications.#
Platform/paradigm$constraint:# The#approach#works#at# the# requirement# specification# level,#
but# is# specific# for# telecommunication# systems# and# also# deals# with# only# functional#
requirements.##
Tool$Support/Case$Studies:$The#FIN#method#is#supported#by#a#tool#with#graphical#support#for#
the# specification# of# features# and# use# cases.# The# tool# also# supports# creation# of# the# service#
usage#graphs#and#automatic#detection#of#interaction#prone#feature#combinations.##
2.4.3$ CHISEL$
[Turner# 2000]# describes# the# CHISEL# notation# (a# graphical# language# for# describing#
telecommunication#services#and# features)# in# the#context#of# feature# interaction.#The#CHISEL#
approach# focuses# on# understanding# the# feature# design# first,# without# the# formal# notation.#
CHISEL#gives# the#event# sequences# that# characterise# the# features#with# the#help#of#Message#
Sequence# Charts# (MSCs),# hierarchical# textual# descriptions,# finite# state# automata,# regular#
expressions# and# process# algebra.#Moreover,# the# extension# of# CHISEL# incorporates# the# use#
two# formal# languages:# SDL# (Specification# Description# Language)# and# LOTOS# (Language# for#
Temporal# Order# Specification).# This# gives# rise# to# a# new# name# for# the# extended# approach,#
namely#CRESS#(CHISEL#Representation#Employing#Systematic#Specification).##
CRESS# uses# SDL# to# specify# the# features# in# a# system# and# LOTOS# with# its# synchronous#
communication#provides#the#interactions#between#features.##
System$Model:#This#approach#uses#CRESS#that#has#formal#denotation#given#by#SDL#.#However#
the# interpretation# of# CRESS# corresponds# closely# to# an# LTS# (Labelled# Transition# System).#
CHISEL# diagrams# are# translated# to# Message# Sequence# Charts,# hierarchical# textual#
descriptions,# finite# state# automata,# regular# expression# and# process# algebra# at# the#
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requirement# specification# level.# This# helps# to# address# possible# combinations# that# have# the#
possibility#of#feature#interaction.##
Composition$ Mechanism:# The# approach# uses# SDL# and# LOTOS# specification# for# the#
composition# of# different# features# and# services.# CHISEL# diagrams# are# given# a# formal#
representation# in# SDL# and# LOTOS.# Feature$ Interaction$ Analysis:# LOTOS# in# CRESS# uses#
synchronous#communication# that#provides# the# interactions#between# features.#Features#are#
simulated#and#the#detailed#exploration#of#each#feature’s#behaviour#is#analysed#in#depth.#The#






Laboratory),# along#with# the#detailed#exploration#of# each# feature’s#behaviour# in#depth.# The#




by# using# first# order# linear# temporal# logic.# Their# methodology# is# supported# by# the# Z#
specification# language,#where# logical#operators#can#be#used#to#compose#different#modules.#
The#aim#of#this#methodology#was#to#reduce#deadlocks#and#composition#of#services.##
[Hay# and# Atlee# 2000]# consider# each# feature# as# a# separate# concern# and# model# them# as#
separate# labelled9transition# systems# by# defining# a# conflict9free# (CF)# composition# operator.#
This#approach#claims# to#prevent# feature# interactions#by#defining#conflict#and#violation# free#











running.# [Marples# and# Magill# 1998],# [Reiff# 2000]# and# [Cain# 1992]# describe# the# use# of# a#
Feature#Manager# to#analyse#and#detect# feature# interactions# in# telecommunication#services#
at#run#time.##
The# problem# of# feature# interactions# is# not# limited# to# the# telecommunications# domain.#
Interaction# analysis# is# a# well9formed# area# in# the# aspect# oriented# community.# The#work# of#
[Katz#et#al.#2008]#describes#a#generic#categorisation#of#aspects#which#can#aid#in#the#analysis#
of# interactions# with# an# automatic# detection# analysis.# Its# main# application# to# interference#
between#modules#is#when#advices#apply#at#the#same#joinpoint,#as#the#categorisation#can#aid#
with# determining# the# correct# order# of# application.# [Clifton# and# Leavens# 2002]# propose# a#
language# to# see# the# impact# between# different# modules# and# provide# some# interaction#
analysis#in#terms#of#the#specifications#of#the#respective#advices.##
There# are# also# some# model9checking# approaches# to# interaction# analysis# in# an# aspect#
orientated# context.# [Goldman# and# Katz# 2007]# present# a# modular# aspect# verification#
technique#to#analyse#the#aspects’#impact#by#using#linear#temporal#logic#(LTL)#formulae.#In#this#
approach,# the# aspect’s# behaviour# can# be# verified# independently# from# a# base# system# by#
weaving#the#aspect#in#LTL#and#model#checking#the#result.##
A# similar# approach# is# presented# by# [Krishnamurthi# et# al.# 2004].#Model# checking# is# used# to#
determine#if#the#properties#of#the#base#system#will#indeed#remain#inviolated#when#the#aspect#
is# woven.# This# approach# is# useful# to# detect# bad# interactions# between# aspects# and# base#
models.##
[Kolberg# et# al.# 2003]# discuss# the# issue# of# compatibility# between# services# in# a# home#
environment#giving#reasons,#why#and#how#services#interact.#This#approach#further#presents#a#
taxonomy# of# interactions# followed# by# an# approach# to# prevent# interactions.# The# issue# of#
feature# interactions# is# illustrated# with# a# number# of# scenarios# focusing# on# automatic#
detection# of# feature# interactions# between# services# in# the# home.# Similarly,# [Soares# et# al.#
2012]#propose#the#use#of#state#graphs# to#predict# the# feature# interactions#between#off9the9







telecommunication# domain.# Especially,# these# approaches# do# not# consider# the# undesirable#
interactions#that#arise#when#fault#tolerance#have#been#added.##
A#summary#of#these#approaches#is#provided#in#Table#2.3#below.#








Tool#Support/Case#Studies# UCM#Navigator,#Telecom# CMS#and#Crystal#Game# SDL,#LOTOS,#LOLA#
Table#2.3:#Feature#Interaction#Analysis#
2.5$Comparison$and$Discussion$
An#overall# comparison#of# results# from# this# chapter#are# summarised# in#Table#2.4.#Together,#
these#surveyed#studies#provide#an# important# insight# into#the#direction#of# fault# tolerance#at#
requirement# specification# and# design# phase,# aspect# oriented# design# and# modelling#
addressing# separation# of# concerns,# feature# composition# and# feature# interactions# analysis.#
However,# there# are# also# a# number# of# limitations# of# these# approaches,# regarding# the#
requirements#laid#out#in#chapter#1#for#this#thesis:#
Most# of# the# approaches# described# in# the# architecting# fault# tolerance# section# provide# an#
explicit# description# of# components,# the# notion# of# connectors,# configuration,# and#
architectural# interfaces# and# also# explicitly# deal# with# exception# handling.# Most# of# the#
surveyed# approaches# have# successfully# shown# the# differentiation# between# the# fault#
tolerance# requirements# and# functional# requirements.#But#most#of# them#are#dealing#with#a#
very# basic# level# of# exception# handling.# Other# approaches# provide# formal# or# model# based#
notations# for# specifying# fault# tolerance# properties.# These# approaches# also# focus# on# the#
architecture#level#and#are#based#on#existing#languages#or#notations#such#as#CSP,#Petri#Nets,#B#
method,# etc.# Few# approaches# are# supported# by# automated# tools# to# implement# a# fault#




There# is# still# a# need# to# describe# the# complex# fault# tolerance# mechanisms# such# as# active#
replication# or# N# version# programming# with# a# separation# of# concerns.# Aspect# oriented#
modelling#approaches#are#considered#as#a#good#solution#for#that.#It#is#also#believed#that#the#
orthogonal# view#of# the# fault# tolerance#with# separate# concerns# can# support# reusability# and#
easy#maintainability#of#different#fault#tolerance#mechanisms#than#a#large#monolithic#system.##
As# can# be# seen# in# Table# 2.4,# the# approaches# under# fault# tolerance# at# architectural# level#
classification# partially# address# the# issue# of# separation# of# concerns,# fault# tolerance#
composition#and# the# feature# interaction#analysis.#Mostly#aspect#oriented#approaches#deals#
with#the#separation#of#concerns#and#the#composition#of#these#concerns.##However,#this#is#still#
a#big#challenge#to#develop#a#language#for#expressing#composition#strategies#and#techniques.#
These# approaches# generally# discuss# the# aspect# weaving# but# do# not# addresses# specifically#
fault#tolerance#concerns#at#a#certain#desired#level.###
Various# studies# successfully# highlight# the# problem# of# feature# interactions# and# provide#
solutions#to#overcome#this#problem.#These#approaches#use#formal#methods,#logic#properties,#





Similarly,# as# shown# in# Table# 2.4,# the# approaches# under# feature# interaction# analysis#
classification#partially# address# the# composition#of# features.#However,# these#approaches#do#




• Design# diversity# fault# tolerance# mechanisms:# The# focus# of# the# thesis# is# on#
incorporating#design#diversity# fault# tolerance#mechanism#at# the#design# level# based#
on# the# requirement# specifications.# Most# of# the# surveyed# approaches# deal# with#
exception#handling#mechanisms,#but#do#not#provide#any#mean#to#manage#different#
features# of# design# diversity# mechanisms.# Design# diversity# fault# tolerance#





• Orthogonal# Fault# Tolerance# Framework# at# Design# Level:# Although# surveyed#
approaches# deal#with# fault# tolerance# at# the# design# level,#most# are# very# specific# to#
architectural# configurations# such# as# components,# connectors,# etc.# Model# driven#
approaches# such# as# DRIP# provides# a# concept# of# modularisation# and# can# be# a#
motivational#approach#that#used#separation#of#fault#tolerance#concerns.#However,#an#
orthogonal#view#of# the# fault# tolerance#concerns# is#missing# in#most#of# the#surveyed#
approaches.# With# the# introduction# of# an# orthogonal# framework,# fault# tolerance#
mechanisms#are#well#separated#and#can#be#reused#with#different#components#of#the#
base#system.#The#separation#of#concerns#is#aimed#to#reduce#software#complexity#and#
improve# software# evolution# by# keeping# track# of# different# fault# tolerance#
mechanisms.##
• Composition#of#Fault#Tolerance#Mechanisms:#The#surveyed#techniques#deal#with#the#
composition# of# crosscutting# aspects# but# not# specific# to# any# design# diversity# fault#
tolerance#mechanism.#In#particular,#when#fault#tolerance#is#incorporated#in#a#system,#
there# may# be# unintended# or# uncertain# interactions# which# can# be# resolved# by#
reasoning# before# composition.# The# orthogonal# view# of# the# fault# tolerance#
mechanism# will# help# in# composition# of# these# features,# as# provides# dependency#
relationships#and#constraints#between#features.##
• Dealing# with# interaction:# The# approaches# in# the# telecommunications# domain# deal#
with#the#problems#of#feature#interaction#prevention,#detection#and#resolution.#None#
of# the#surveyed#approaches#address# the#problem#of# interactions#arising#when# fault#
tolerance# mechanisms# are# composed# with# the# system.# To# deal# with# potential#
undesirable#interactions,#it#is#very#important#and#crucial#to#know#about#the#features’#
dependencies.# With# respect# to# fault# tolerance,# the# selection# of# the# appropriate#
mechanism# also# depends# on# the# clear# understanding# of# components’# dependency#
relationships.# Incorporating# fault# tolerance# into# a# system# also# brings# with# it# an#








and# interaction# analysis.# These# areas# still# provide# an# inspiration# for# separation# of# concern#
and#feature# interaction#analysis# for#designing# fault# tolerance#system.# In#summary,#with# the#
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Variability# Model# [Pohl# et# al.# 2006].# The# key# benefits# of# OVM# are# the# improvement# of#





In# the# proposed# orthogonal# fault# tolerance# model,# fault# tolerance# mechanisms# are# well#
separated#and#can#be#reused#with#different#components#of#the#base#system.#The#separation#
of#concerns#aims#to#reduce#software#complexity#and#improve#software#evolution#by#keeping#
track# of# different# fault# tolerance# mechanisms.# The# orthogonality# in# this# thesis# also#
establishes# the# relationships#and#constraints#between# features#of#different#design#diversity#
fault# tolerance# mechanisms# based# on# their# dependencies.# In# addition,# analysing# the#




on#operational# semantics# that#describe# the#behaviour#of# the#underlying#components#when#
composed#with#the#fault#tolerance#mechanisms.#The#customIbuilt#preIprocessor#is#based#on#
these#composition#rules,#and# is#used#to#automatically#compose#the#system#component#and#




Section# 3.3.4.# The# orthogonal# fault# tolerance# framework# is# also# supported# by# the# model#
checking#tool#NuSMV;#the#automatically#generated#output#of#the#preIprocessor#is#used#as#an#
input#for#NuSMV.##




both# the# main# system# component# and# the# fault# tolerance# features# are# expressed# using#
Labelled# Transition# Systems.# These# two# orthogonal# parts# of# the# overall# system# are# then#
composed# using# a# preIprocessor# underpinned# by# operational# semantics,# and# this# tool#
automatically# generates# the# input# language# for# the# model# checker.# The# models# are# then#





The# rest# of# this# chapter# will# describe# the# different# elements# of# the# Orthogonal# Fault#
Tolerance#Model# in# greater# detail.# Section# 3.2# contains# details# of# the# different# features# of#
fault# tolerance# mechanisms,# including# subsections# on# feature# dependency# analysis# and#
constraints.#Section#3.3#provides#detail#on#the#composition#in#the#orthogonal#fault#tolerance#









diversity# mechanisms# are# mainly# developed# to# deal# with# design# faults.# By# using# design#
diversity,# a# central# assumption# is# that# failure# is# rare# in# the# presence# of# different# software#
variants.##This#work#is#on#the#design#level#rather#than#the#implementation#and#testing#level.#
Table# 1# shows# the# main# characteristics# of# the# design# diversity# software# fault# tolerance#
mechanisms# that# have# been# considered# so# far.# All# of# these# use# multiple# versions# of# the#






In#Table#3.1,# the#rows#show#five#common#design#diversity# fault# tolerance#mechanisms.#The#
different#features#employed#in#these#mechanisms#are#shown#by#the#columns#of#the#table.##
• The# judgment# criterion# is# the# adjudicator# that# helps# to# decide# the# correct# result#
among# different# variants.# There# are# three# different# adjudicators:# Acceptance# Test#
(AT),#Voter#and#Hybrid#(combination#of#both#the#Acceptance#Test#and#the#Voter).#
• The# variants# in# different# design# diversity# fault# tolerance# mechanisms# run# either#





















NIself#checking#Programming# Hybrid# Sequential/Parallel# Forward/#Backward# Yes/No#
Distributed#Recovery#Block# AT# Sequential# Forward# No#
Consensus#Recovery#Block# Hybrid# Sequential/Parallel# Forward/#Backward# Yes/No#
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The# details# of# the# dependency# constraints# and# relationships# between# these# different#
features#of#fault#tolerance#mechanisms#are#presented#in#the#following#section.##
3.2.1(Feature(Dependency(Analysis(
Before# specifying# the# formalisms# for# different# features# of# design# diversity# fault# tolerance#

















According# to# the# OFTM,# there# are# four#mandatory# features# of# fault# tolerance# techniques;#
these# relate# to# the# number# of# versions# in# use,# and# also# the# type# of# execution# scheme,#
adjudicator#and#error#recovery#scheme#being#used.#The#mandatory#features#are#as#follows:#

































• By# combining# constraints# 1# and# 3,# it# is# possible# to# achieve# a# Recovery( Block#
mechanism.# This# would# consist# of# nIVersions# executing# Sequentially# with# an#
Acceptance#Test#and#Backward#Error#Recovery#(and#hence#also#Checkpointing);#









Operational# semantics# are# introduced# in# order# to# provide# a# formal# basis# to# underpin# the#
rules# for# composition# in# the#OFT# framework.#Operational# semantics# are# used# to# show# the#
behaviour# of# different# processes# by# specifying# transitions# from# a# process’s# state# on# a#
particular# event.# The# purpose# of# developing# operational# semantics# is# to# give# behavioural#
descriptions#of#programs#and#systems,# in# the# form#of#mathematical# formalisms,# to#support#
understanding# and# reasoning# about# the# behaviour# of# programs# and# software# systems#
[Prasad#2003].#More#specifically,#in#this#thesis,#operational#semantics#are#used#to#provide#the#




















Sequential( Execution.# Assume# that# an# event# e# is# followed# sequentially# by# process# P.# This#
sequential#operation#is#denoted#by#the#operator#‘;’#and#can#be#represented#as#follows:#




















If# process# P1# can# transition# from# s1# into# a# new# state# by# performing# an# event# e1,# then# the#
parallel#interleaving#composition#of#P1#|||#P2#can#be#described#as#follows:#s! !! s!! !s!|||!s! !! s!! !|||!s!#
Similarly,#if#process#P2#can#transition#from#s2#by#performing#an#event#e2:#s! !! s!! !s!|||!s! !! s!!|||!s!! #
#







then#the#selective#composition#of#P1#|[#E#]|#P2#can#be#described#as#follows:#s! ! s!! , s! ! s!!s!| E |!s! ! s!! !| E |!s!! #
However,# if# one# process# P1# can# transition# into# a# new# state# on# an# event# e#∉# E,# then# the#
process#can#progress#independently#of#P2:# s! ! s!! !s!| E |!s! ! s!! !| E |!s!#
Note# that# the# interleaving#operator# is# a# special# case#of# the# selective# composition#operator#






an#event#e2.#This#is#represented#by#the#following#interference#rules:##s !! s!e!; P!![]!e!;P! !! P!#










It#will# sometimes#be#necessary# to#express# conditions# (guards)#over# variables# to#ensure# that#
the# transitions#only# take#place#under# the#specified#conditions# (expressed#as#predicates#over#



































e; P ! P#
This#can#be#extended#with#conditions#and#actions#by#considering#the#conditionIeventIaction#
triple#as#follows:#
< !, !, ! >;! !,!,! P#
This# ensures# that# if# the# condition# c# holds,# the# event# e# will# be# performed# and# will# be#
accompanied#by#action#a.#
#





# s! !!,!,!! s!! !, s! !!,!,!! s!!s!‖s! !!&&!!,!,!!;!! s!! ‖s!! #
#





















specification,# termed# ‘generics’# here,# is# introduced# for# the# specification# of# fault# tolerance#
components.#To#illustrate#this,#a#simple#example#of#an#Acceptance#Test#is#given#below.#Further#
examples#of# alternative# fault# tolerance#mechanisms#will# be#presented# in# the#context#of# the#
case#studies#in#Chapters#4#and#5.##
To#express#the#behaviour#of#an#Acceptance#Test#in#a#style#that#is#orthogonal#to#the#underlying#















The#necessary# transitions# relating# to#an#acceptance# test#with#checkpointing# (saved#recovery#
points)#can#now#be#expressed#as#follows:# g ! g′#g !!,!,!!! Rp(g)#
#















Acceptance# Test# fails,# this# means# that# the# current# version# of# the# system# component# will#
terminate#and#control#will#be#passed# to# the#next# version#of# the#component# starting#at# the#
saved#recovery#point.#
Using#the#style#of#operational#semantics#presented#above,#it#is#possible#to#give#the#following#
two# inference# rules# to# allow# an# underlying# system# component# to# be# composed#with# a# FT#
feature#such#as#an#Acceptance#Test:##
s ! sʹ!, g ! g′s!‖g !,! sʹ !!!! i !acceptance!test!succeeds!#
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#
In#this#first# inference#rule,# if#the#Acceptance#Test# is#passed#(c# is#true),#then#the#state#of#the#
underlying#system#component#progresses#as#usual# (s !,! sʹ),#and# the#generic# states#g#and#g’#
are# mapped# to# the# concrete# states# (s# and# s’),# and# then# disappear# as# shown# in# above#
interference#rule#result.##







g !!,!,!!! Rp(g)!s!‖g! !!,!,!!!Rp(s) !!! ii !acceptance!test!fails#






F’# represent# the# behaviour# once# the# Acceptance# Test# has# passed.# In# the# case# of# the#





P! ! P!ʹ!, F ! F′P!‖F !,! P!ʹ !!! iii !acceptance!test!succeeds!#
With# this# first# inference# rule,# only# the# level# of# abstraction# has# changed.# If# the#Acceptance#
Test# is# passed# (c# is# true),# then# process# Pi# (representing# the# underlying# system# behaviour)#
59#
#
progresses# as# usual# by# performing# event# e# and# transitioning# to# process# Pi’.# As# above,# the#
transition# of# the# generic# process# F# to# F’# does# not# require# an# event,# since# the# event# is#
determined#by#the#underlying#system#component.#
However,# consider# the# above# case# where# the# Acceptance# Test# fails.# If# states# are# simply#
replaced#by#processes,#the#second#inference#rule#would#become#the#following:#
F !!,!,!!! Rp FP! ∥ F !!!,!,!!!! Rp P! !!! iv !acceptance!test!fails#
However,#this#makes#no#reference#to#the#next#version#of#the#process,#Pi+1,#needing#to#be#
invoked#from#the#saved#recovery#point.#Hence,#the#following#inference#rule#is#introduced:#




then# process# Pi+1#must# be# instantiated# sequentially# (assuming# variation# i+1# of# the# process#
exists).#This#new#process#Pi+1#will#be#started#at#the#saved#recovery#point#represented#by#Rp(Pi)#
In#the#case#that#Pi+1#does#not#exist,#the#composition#will#be#stopped.#
F !!,,!!! Rp F , ∄P!!!P! ∥ F  !stop !!! vi !no!versions!left#
Examples#of#Voting#and#Hybrid#fault#tolerance#mechanisms#will#be#presented#in#the#context#of#
the#case#studies#in#chapters#4#and#5,#but#it#is#worth#noting#here#that#these#can#be#expressed#in#
a# similar# way# with# a# variable# ‘r’# that# represents# the# voting# result# and# both# ‘c’# and# ‘r’#
representing#the#hybrid#voter#as#follows:#s ! sʹ!, g ! g′s!‖g !,! sʹ #












As# stated# in# Section# 3.3.3# above,# components# can# be# composed# in# parallel#with# conditions#
taken# into# account;# if# both# conditions# hold# then# composition# proceeds# as# stated# in# the#




< !, !, ! >;! !,!,! P#
#
#However,# if#one#or#more#fault#tolerance#conditions#fail,#then#the#synchronised#transition#on#
event# e# is# blocked,# and# a# component’s# recovery# points# must# be# taken# into# account.# The#
inference#rules#for#this#kind#of#behaviour#are#as#follows:#s! !!!,! Rp(s!)s!‖s! !!!,!! Rp(s!)‖s!#
And#similarly,# s! !!!,! Rp(s!)s!‖s! !!!,!! s!‖Rp(s!)#
(
3.3.6( PreVProcessor(Tool((Lex(&(Yacc)(
The# Orthogonal# Fault# Tolerance# framework# provides# the# separation# of# fault# tolerance#
concerns# and# the# base# system.# The# features# of# different# fault# tolerance# mechanisms# are#














and# uses# regular# expressions# to# scan# and#match# strings# and# convert# them# to# tokens.# This#
stage#generates#a#file#lex.yy.c,#which#contains#C#code#for#the#Lexer.#In#the#second#phase,#Yacc#
uses#a#context#free#grammar#to#generate#the#constructs#required#for#the#NuSMV#input#file.#
To#parse#an#expression,# shiftIreduce#parsing# is#used.#This#phase#generates# the# files# y.tab.h#
and# y.tab.c.# Both# of# these# c# files# are# compiled# and# produce# the# required# output# file# (in#
NuSMV#format).##
#
The# textual# and# graphical# representation# of# a# simple# example# for# a# Recovery# Block#







states = {s1, s2}; 
events = {a, b}; 
start  = s1, a; // initial state &event for NuSMV 
transitions = {  
 s1, _, a, _, s2; 










states = {g, g’}; 
condition= {c}; 
n = 1;  // number of software version 
max_n = 3; // max number of versions 
start  = g, c; 
transitions = {  
 g, c, _, _, g’; 








on# the# failure# of# one# version.# The# variable# g# represents# the# generic# states# onto#which# any#







transitions# onto# these# component# transitions.# The# system# transitions# are# then# augmented#
with#the#extra#information#from#the#fault#tolerance#feature;#this#can#take#the#form#of#adding#
conditions#and#actions,#and/#or#changing# the#destination#state.#The#overall# result#of# this# for#
the#acceptance# test# is# the# inclusion#of# the#additional# guard#condition# ‘c’.# In# the# case#of# the#
failure#of# this# condition,# the# software# version#being# executed#will# also#be# incremented# and#
recovery#will#be#from#the#state#represented#by#the#saved#recovery#point.#
#
This# algorithm# is# based# on# the# operational# semantics# provided# in# section# 3.3.2# with# the#
choice#of#implementing#parallel#composition#or#sequential#composition#and#also#considering#





































the#summary#below:##g ! g!, !! ! !! ⇒ !! !,! !!#g ! g!, !! ! !! ⇒ !! !,! !!#




one# of# the# sequential# execution# of# the# different# software# versions,# and# the# use# of# saved#




the# modelIchecking# tool# NuSMV.# The# input# format# and# the# output# produced# (composed#
64#
#
FSMs#with#fault# tolerance#and#model#checking# in#NuSMV#screenshots)# #are#shown#with#the#
help#of#case#studies#and#are#presented#in#Appendices#A#&#B.##
3.3.7(Revisiting(other(Fault(Tolerance(Features(handled(by(‘Generics’(
A# similar# algorithm# is# used# in# the# cases# of# nIversion# programming# or# nIselfIchecking#
programming,#where#a#parallel#execution#scheme#is#used#along#with#either#Voting#or#a#Hybrid#
adjudicator#(as#described#in#Section#3.2.3).##




g ! g! ⇒ s! !,! s!!!!!acceptance!test#
The# generic# FT# component# imposes# a# condition# on# a# transition# between# states# of# the#




between#states#of#the#underlying#component.#g ! g ⇒ s! !,! s!!!!!voter#
For#example,#a#motion_detected transition (when composed with the generic voting component) 
would become s! !"#$%&!!"#$%&,!!! "#$"%_!"#"$#"! s!##
#
However,# in# case# of# Hybrid# voter,# both# ATIcondition# as# well# as# VotingIresult# are#
imposed#on#a#transition#between#states#of#the#underlying#component.###g !,! g ⇒ s! !&&!,! s!!!!!hybrid!voter#
For example, a motion_detected transition (when composed with a generic hybrid component) 
would become #s! !"!!"#$%&%"#!&&! "#$%&!!"#$%&,!!! "#$"%_!"#"$#"! s!##
#
• Execution( Scheme:# With# the# introduction# of# an# integer# variable,# n,# execution#
schemes# can# be# specified# such# as# a# sequential# execution# scheme,# where# the#




Similarly,# in# a# parallel# execution# scheme,# all# n# versions# can# be# executed#
simultaneously# and#generate#a# result# ‘r’# based#on#a#majority# voting#algorithm.#The#
forward# error# recovery# scheme# in# parallel# execution# scheme# can# be# specified# as#
follows,#where#exc(s)#represents#a#new#forward#safe#state#represented#by#exception#
handling:# g !!,! exc g , !! ! !! ⇒ !! !!,! exc(s!)""





g !!,!,!!! Rp(g)!, !! ! !! ⇒ !! !!,! nextVer: s!!#
In# the# case# of# forward# error# recovery,# if# the# voting# does# not# produce# a# majority#
result# then# the# system# transitions# to# a# new# safe# state,# for# example# by# using#
exception# handling.# This# new# safe# state# needs# to# be# introduced# into# the#
specification# of# the# fault# tolerance# feature.# Suppose# this# new# safe# state# is#
represented#by#exc(g)# that#will#be#mapped#on# to#a#new#state# from# the#underlying#
system#component:#
g !!,! exc(g), !! ! !! ⇒ !! !!,! exc(s!)!"
• Checkpointing:( As# explained# in# the# constraints# Section# of# 3.2.2,# checkpointing# is#
always#dealt#with#in#the#context#of#backward#error#recovery#and#recovery#points#and#
can#therefore#be#presented#as#above,#as#if#the#acceptance#test#condition#fails:#
g !!,!,!!! Rp(g)!, !! ! !! ⇒ !! !!,! nextVer: s!#
If# checkpointing# is# taken# into# account# for# the# parallel# execution# scheme,# it# can# be#
represented#as#follows:#








analysis# and#detection#of# feature# interactions# can#help#prevent# costly# and# time#consuming#
problems#at#the#later#stages#of#software#implementation.#It#is#therefore#essential#to#address#
and# reason# about# these# interactions# as# early# as# possible,# such# as# at# the# requirement#
specification#and#at#the#design#level.##
[Calder#et#al.#2000]#have#presented#a#critical#review#on#feature#interactions#concentrating#on#
three# different# research# trends;# software# engineering,# formal# methods# and# online#
techniques.#Background#research#in#this#area#has#been#covered#in#Chapter#2.#
In#the#OFT#framework,#fault#tolerance#features#are#specified#separately,#and#later#composed#
with# the# system’s# components# to# offer# reliability.# However,# sometimes# the# orthogonal#
nature# of# this# approach# may# cause# undesirable# interactions.# The# proposed# approach# for#
handling#such#feature#interaction#analysis#has#three#parts,#as#described#in#Fig#3.4:##
1. Classification# of# Categories# of# Interactions:# it# is# essential# to# have# a# sound#
classification#towards#a#general#scheme#for#detecting#and#analysing#undesirable#
feature#interactions.##
2. Specification# and# ability# to# Reason# about# Interactions:# reasoning# about# these#














components# are# controlling# the# same# service# (or# device),# but# simultaneously#
invoke#it#with#different#actions.#For#example,#one#component#may#want#to#turn#a#
device#off#whilst#the#other#component#wants#to#turn#it#on.# 










(iii) Sequential( Action( Interaction:# In# this# type# of# interaction,# the# first# component#
changes#some#element#of#the#environment,#which#in#turn#may#trigger#a#second#








case# where# the# number# of# allocated# resources# is# equal# to# the# number# of#
available# resources,# an# additional# request# to# the# resources# will# result# in# a#
resource# contention# interaction.# In# the# figure# below,# R# represents# a# single#




be# represented# through# assertion# properties,# which# can# later# be# validated#
through#modelIchecking.#This#type#of#interaction#is#detected#when#a#component#
or# feature# intention# is# violated# in# the# system.# In# other# words,# an# assertion#
invalidation# interaction# occurs# when# an# assertion# made# for# the# system’s#
behaviour#is#invalidated#or#false.#An#example#is:#
AG# (p→q)#which#means# that#whenever#property#p#has#been# raised,#property#q#
must#also#have#been#raised.#
If#this#assertion#p#is#true#and#q#is#false,#it#means#the#assertion#is#violated#and#the#
















In# contrast,# the# formula# EG#p# requires# that# there# is# some#path# of# the# system#along#which#
property#p#is#always#true.#
Eventually:(AF#p,#EF#p#
In# the# logic# formula#AF#p,# for#all# the#paths#of# the# system,#eventually# (at# some#point# in# the#
future)#property#p#must#hold.#That#is,#all#the#possible#evolutions#of#the#system#will#eventually#
reach#a#state#satisfying#property#p.##














3.4.3( Reasoning( about( Feature( Interactions( through( CTL( and( Model(
Checking(
The#proposed#method#of#reasoning#about#the#above#classifications#of#Feature#Interactions#is#
based# on# the# specification# of# properties# in# CTL,# and# then# using# model# checking# with# the#
support#of#the#tool#NuSMV.#This#aims#to#detect#each#type#of# feature# interaction#defined# in#
the#classification#above.##
Previous#model# checking# based# feature# interaction# detection#methods# have,# for# example,#
used#the#SPIN#model#checker#(Promela)#for#web#services#[Zhang#et#al.#2007]#and#LOTOS#and#
SDL# for# Telecommunications# [Blom# et# al.# 1992].# However,# for# the# OFT# framework,# the#
NuSMV#model#checker#is#used.#
CTL# formulae# can# be# used# to# modelIcheck# for# the# above# mentioned# styles# of# feature#
interaction# as# represented# below,# where# ‘p’# represents# the# property# where# the# first#







For# example,# ensuring# that# one# component# does# not# turn# a# device# off# whilst# the# other#
component#turns#it#on:#AG#!#(on#&#off).#
For#Shared(Trigger(Interactions,#one#component#controls#a#service#through#one#event,#and#a#









For# Sequential( Action( Interaction,# if# the# first# component# changes# the# environment,# this#
change#triggers#a#second#component.#This#style#of#interaction#can#be#represented#as#follows:#
AG((p&q)#I>#AFr)#
For# example,# a# Climate# Control# component# opens# and# closes# windows# according# to# the#
temperature,#which#might#cause#a#sensor#to#detect#motion#due#to#environment#change;#this#
may# trigger# other# components# to# take# action# according# to# this# motion# detection# such# as#





According# to# this# property,# it#will# never# be# the# case#where# two# components# can# hold# the#




For#Assertion( Invalidation,# different# combinations# of# temporal# and# Boolean# logics# can# be#
used#depending#on# the# assertions#made# according# to# the# system’s# intended# and#expected#
behaviours.# For# example# in# the# above# case# of# a# shared# printer,# suppose# that#whenever# a#
component# has# requested# the# printer,# it# will# eventually# obtain# it.# This# assertion# can# be#
represented#with#temporal#logic#as#follows:#
AG#((c1.#state#=#requesting#&#waiting)#I>AF#(c1.state#=#printing))#
In# this#example,# if# the# logic# formula# is# false,# that#means#assertion# is#violated.#Furthermore,#










help#of# this# framework,# fault# tolerance#features#can#be#composed#with# the#components#of#
the# underlying# system# at# the# early# stages# of# software# development.# Moreover,# fault#
tolerance# features# are# considered# as# separate# concerns# and# their# composition# is#
underpinned# by# operational# semantics.# Using# a# logicIbased# feature# interaction# analysis#













The! illustrative! example! that! will! be! used! to! highlight! the! key! elements! of! the! proposed!
approach! is! that! of! a! simple!Home!Automation! scenario,!where! a! house! is! fully! equipped!
with!a!set!of!electrical!sensors!and!actuators.!Figure!1!below!is!a!Feature!Diagram!for!a!smart!
home,!which!provides!security!and!illumination!services.!!
Initially! this! example! will! be! presented! with! no! fault! tolerance!mechanisms! incorporated.!










of! this! feature! is! to! automatically! turn! the! lights! on.! It! detects!motion! by! using! a!motion!







This! state!machine! shows! that,! from! the! initial! Automatic! Lights!On! state,! if! no!motion! is!
detected! then! the! system! stays! in! the! same! state,! but! once!motion! is! detected! then! the!
system! transitions! into! a! Lighting! By! Presence! state.! From! this! new! state,! if! motion! is!
detected! then! the!system!stays! in! this! state,!but! if!no!motion! is!detected! then! the!system!
transitions!back!into!the!Automatic!Lights!On!state.!!
Now!consider!a!scenario!where!a!new!feature,!Presence!Simulation!(for!security)!is!required.!
This! feature! simulates! that! the! home! is! occupied! by! turning! lights! on! and! off! while! the!
occupants! are! away.! The!Home!Status!Controller! (HSC)! component! identifies! the! status!of!
the!home:!either!empty!or!occupied.!This! status! is!determined!by!using!a!motion!detector!
sensor.!






















and! are! used! to! give! behavioural! descriptions! in! a! mathematical! form! that! supports!
understanding!and!reasoning!about!the!system’s!behaviour.!(see!Section!3.3.1)!
This! section! will! show! the! application! of! Labelled! Transition! Systems! (LTS)! to! the! Home!
Automation.!!
!







! T!" !" = {AL_on !" LBP, LBP !" LBP}!and!










! T!"# !" = {H_empty !" H_occupied,H_occupied !" H_occupied}!and!!




Operational! semantics,! as! presented! in! Section! 3.3.2,! are! used! for! the! composition! of! the!
Light!Controller!(LC)!and!the!Home!Status!Controller!(HSC).!The!LC!and!HSC!components!are!
designed! to! run! in! parallel! and,! from! their! initial! states,! the! same! event! (MD)! triggers! a!
transition! into! their! respective! next! states.! Hence,! according! to! the! inference! rule! for! the!
parallel!composition!presented!in!Section!3.3.2,!the!components!can!be!composed!as!follows.!
For!the!first!event,!MD,!the!two!possible!transitions!are!as!follows:!AL_on !" LBP,H_empty !" H_occupiedAL_on!‖H_empty!!!" LBP‖H_occupied !LBP !" LBP,H_occupied !" H_occupiedLBP!‖H_occupied!!!" LBP‖H_occupied !
Similarly,!for!the!second!event,!NMD,!the!two!possible!transitions!are:! !
LBP !"# AL_on,H_occupied !"# H_emptyLBP‖H_occupied !"#AL_on‖H_empty !











with! checkpointing! in! a! Sequential! execution! scheme,! secondly! a! Parallel! execution!with! a!
Voter!mechanism!and!thirdly!a!Parallel!execution!with!a!Hybrid!voter!(voter!and!acceptance!









As! presented! in! Section! 3.3.4,! the! labels! g! and! g’! represent! generic! states! and! ‘c’! is! the!
condition!required! for! the!acceptance!test! to!be!passed.!The!operational!semantics!can!be!
applied!here!to!compose!this!acceptance!test!with!the!LC!component!of!Home!Automation!
as!follows,!i.e.!the!composition!of!figure!4.2a!and!figure!4.4:!




! g ! g!, LBP !"# AL_on ⇒ LBP !,!"# AL_on!
! g ! g!,AL_on !"# AL_on ⇒ AL_on !,!"# AL_on!










! g !!,!!,!!! Rp g ⇒ LBP||g !!,!,!!!! Rp(LBP)!
!
These!rules!can!also!be!expressed!with!processes,!as!in!inference!rule!(iii)!of!Section!3.3.4:!!
LC! ! LC!ʹ!, F ! F′LC!‖F !,! LC!ʹ !!!! iii !acceptance!test!succeeds!
If! the! Acceptance! Test! is! passed! (c! is! true),! then! process! LCi! progresses! as! usual! by!
transitioning!to!process!LCi+1’.!
However,!in!the!case!where!the!Acceptance!Test!fails:!
F !!,! Rp FLC! ∥ F !!!,!! Rp(LC!) !!!! iv !acceptance!test!fails!
However,!the!next!version!of!the!LC!component!is!invoked!with!the!inference!rule!(v)!
introduced!in!Section!3.3.4.!!∃LC!!!(Rp(LC!) !≫ LC!!!) ! !!! LC!!! Rp LC! ∥ F! !!!!(v)!acceptance!test!fails!with!versions!
This!inference!rule!shows!the!sequential!execution!of!n!versions!of!LC,!when!the!acceptance!
test! fails.! If! version! LCi! has! transitioned! into! a! recovery! point! in! the! case! of! a! failed!










In! the! case! that! no! more! versions! of! the! component! exist! i.e.! LCi+1,! does! not! exist,! the!
composition!will!be!stopped.! !∄LC!!!Rp(LC!) ! !stop !!!! vi !no!versions!left!
Similarly,!these!rules!can!be!applied!to!the!composition!of!the!fault!tolerance!mechanism!
(using!generics)!with!the!HSC!component!of!Home!Automation.!!
4.4.2( Applying(a(Fault( tolerance( formalism( for(Parallel( Execution(with(
Voter((
Many!fault! tolerance!mechanisms!use!parallel!execution!as!an!execution!scheme.!Voting! is!
an! important! feature! in! parallel! execution! and! is! used! in! Njversion! Programming!
mechanisms.!The!Voter!acts!as!an!adjudicator!and!is!responsible!for!checking!the!correctness!
of! the! result! produced! by! n! variants! running! in! parallel.! In! case! there! is! a! majority!
agreement,!the!agreed!result!is!used!as!the!"correct"!result.!If!there!is!no!majority,!failure!in!






























of! !r,! the!state! transitions! to!a! safe!state,! that!will!have!been!saved!as!a! recovery!point! in!
case!of!backward!error!recovery.!    !g ! g′ ⇒ s !,! s′!g !!,!! Rp(g) ⇒ s !!,!! Rp(s)!
!






In! case! of! forward! error! recovery,! the! system! state! transitions! to! a! new! safe! state!
represented!by!exception!handling,!exc(g);!this!state!will!be!mapped!on!to!a!new!state!from!
the!underlying!system!component.!






s ! sʹ!, g ! g′s!‖g !,! sʹ !!!! i !Voting!succeeds; !r!is!the!voting!result!!
In!this!first!inference!rule,!if!the!voting!is!performed!and!r!is!the!result,!then!the!state!of!the!
underlying!system!component!progresses!as!usual!with!an!extra!guard!condition!r.!
In! the!second! inference!rule,! if! the!voting! is!unsuccessful!and!fails! to!produce!the!majority!
result,! then! in! the! case! of! backward! error! recovery! the! state! of! the! underlying! system!
component!moves!into!the!saved!recovery!state:!
!g !!,! Rp gs!‖g !!,! Rp(!) !!!!! iia !Voting!fails!(backward!error!recovery)!
However,!in!case!of!voting!failure!and!forward!error!recovery,!a!new!safe!state!represented!
by!exception!handling!will!be!introduced:!
!g !!,! exc gs!‖g !!,! exc(!) !!!!! iib !Voting!fails!(forward!error!recovery)!
Using!the!style!of!operational!semantics!presented!above,!the!inference!rule!for!composing!
the!generics!with!the!LC!component!of!Home!Automation!can!be!applied!as!follows:!
g ! g!,AL_on !" LBP ⇒ AL_on !,!" LBP!g ! g!, LBP !"# AL_on ⇒ LBP !,!"# AL_on!g ! g!,AL_on !"# AL_on ⇒ AL_on !,!"# AL_on!g ! g!, LBP !" LBP ⇒ LBP !,!" LBP!
In!the!case!of!failure!of!voting!and!backward!error!recovery,!!
g !!,! Rp(g),AL_on !" LBP ⇒ AL_on !!,! Rp(AL_on)!
In!the!case!of!forward!error!recovery,!!
g !!,! Rp(g),AL_on !" LBP ⇒ AL_on !!,! exc(AL_on)!





F ! F′LC!‖F !,! LCʹ !!!! iii !Voting!succeeds!
If!r!is!the!voting!result,!then!process!LC!progresses!as!usual!and!transitions!to!process!LC’.!
However,!in!the!case!where!the!voting!does!not!produce!the!correct!result:!
F !!,! Rp(F)LC!‖F !!,! Rp LC !!!! iv !Voting!result!with!recovery!point!







the! use! of! n! versions.! In! the! case! of! the! Hybrid! voter,! all! n! versions! are! executed!
simultaneously! in! parallel.! The! results! from! the! versions! that! have! passed! the! acceptance!
test!go!forward!for!voting.!
Using!the!same!style!of!operational!semantics,! it! is!possible!to!give!the!following! inference!
rules!according!to!the!possible!operations!presented!above:!
s ! sʹ, g !&&! g!s!‖g !&&!,! sʹ !!!! i !c!is!the!acceptance!test!condition!and!r!is!the!voting!result!!
In!this!first!inference!rule,!if!the!acceptance!test!condition!c!is!true!and!voting!is!performed!
and!r! is! the!result,! then!the!state!of!the!underlying!system!component!progresses!as!usual!
with!an!extra!guard!condition!c&&r!before!the!other!state!starts.!
A! further! possibility! with! the! hybrid! voting! scheme! is! that! the! acceptance! test! condition!
passes,! but! voting! fails! to! product! the! correct! result.! In! this! case,! the! state! of! the! system!










results!of!different!variants! (suppose!v1,! v2! and!v3)! are! first!evaluated!against! independent!
acceptance! test! conditions! c1,! c2! and!c3.! Importantly,!only!accepted! results!are! sent! to! the!
voter! to! generate! the! voting! result! r.! However,! if! the! strictly! synchronous! operational!
semantics!is!applied!to!all!the!versions,!then!none!of!these!versions!can!pass!the!composition!
criteria!c1&&c2&&c3,!and!execution!will!be!blocked!and!will!not!progress!to!the!voting.!In!this!
case,! a! refinement! is! required! to! the! existing!operational! semantics! to! accommodate! this.!
For! example,! in! the! case! of! hybrid! fault! tolerance,! the! conjunction! operator! forces! each!
acceptance! test! to! be! true.! This! is! too! strong! and,! instead,! all! successful! acceptance! tests!
should!go!forward!to!voting,!with!any!results!that!fail!the!acceptance!test!being!ignored.!
4.4.4( PreKProcessor(Tool((Lex(&(Yacc)(
The!Prejprocessor! is!written! in!Lex!and!Yacc!and! is!used!to!handle! fault! tolerance!generics!
and! compose! them!with! the! base! system! components.! ! The! detail! of! handling! these! fault!




states = {AL_on, LBP}; 
events = {MD, NMD}; 
start  = AL_on, MD; // needs to specify the 
initial state and initial event for NuSMV 
transitions = {  
 AL_on, _, MD, _, LBP; 
 LBP, _, NMD, _, AL_on; 
AL_on, _, NMD, _, AL_on; 











states = {g, g’}; 
condition = {c}; 




max_n =3; // max number of versions 
start  = g, c; 
transitions = {  
g, c, _, _, g’; 










According! to! the!operational! semantics!presented! in!Section!4.2!and!4.3,! the!prejprocessor!
performs!the!composition!of!the!LC!component!and!the!fault! tolerance!acceptance!test.!An!
algorithm! for! the! composition! of! system! components!with! the! fault! tolerance! features! has!
been!given! in!pseudocode! in!Section!3.3.7.!According! to! this!algorithm,! in!Yacc,! the!generic!
states! of! the! AT! are!mapped! to! the! states! of! the! LC! component!with! the! additional! guard!
condition! ‘c’! for! the!acceptance! test.!The! following!basic! composition! is!obtained! from! the!
Lex!and!Yacc!prejprocessor:!





Similarly,! generics! are! applied! to!HSC! and! their! composition.! The! detailed! code! of! Lex! and!
Yacc!with!the!generated!input!file!for!NuSMV!is!presented!in!Appendix!A.!!
(
4.4.5 Lex( and( Yacc( generated( NuSMV(Models( for( Home( Automation(
Components(







model! presented! in! Appendix! A! for! the! Light! Controller! and! Home! Status! Controller!
composed!with!fault!tolerance!mechanisms,!as!generated!by!the!prejprocessor.!!
For! the! Home! Automation! components,! this! principle! is! used! to! introduce! fault! tolerance!
into!the!system.!Suppose!that!3!variants!of!the!Light!Controller!(LC)!component!are!running!
sequentially.! Let! process! P1,! P2,! P3! represent! the!behaviour! of! LC! component! versions! 1,! 2!
and!3,! the!states!of! the!primary!process!P1!are!saved!as! recovery!points.! If! the!acceptance!
test!evaluation!condition!‘c’!is!passed,!the!process’s!state!is!progressed!as!usual;!otherwise!if!
the!test!fails!or!if!any!errors!are!detected!by!other!means,!then!the!system!is!recovered!back!









When! composed! together,! it! is! expected! that,! if! the! home! is! empty,! then! the!Automated'
Lights! feature!will! be! enabled;! otherwise! the! Lighting' by' Presence! feature!will! be! utilized.!
The!Home!Status!Controller!indicates!whether!the!status!of!the!home!is!empty!or!occupied.!
















in! temporal! logic! formulae.! In! NuSMV,! LTL! specifications! are! introduced! by! the! keyword!
“LTLSPEC”,!whereas!CTL!specifications!are!introduced!by!the!keyword!“SPEC”.!!
With!the!introduction!of!fault!tolerance!mechanisms!(acceptance!tests)!into!two!components!
of! Home! Automation,! one! area! of! potential! feature! interaction! to! check! for! is,! if! one!
















This!model! checking! formula! indicates! that! if! the! state! of! the! light! controller! is! Automatic!
Lights!on! (AL_on)! then! there!will!never!be! the!case!where! the!status!of! the!Home! is!Home!
Occupied! (H_occupied).! ! In! Figure! 4.8! it! is! clearly! shown! that!with! the! recovery!points! and!






Similarly,! this! model! checking! formula! indicates! that! if! the! state! of! the! light! controller! is!
lighting!by!Presence!then!there!will!never!be!the!case!where!simultaneously!the!status!of!the!
































owner! sets! the! Alarm! feature! and! Automatic! Lights! feature! on! to! protect! home! from!
intruders.! The! Alarm! as! well! as! Light! Controller! monitors! the! state! of! the! house! through!
motion! detection! sensors! in! the! house.! In! addition! to!motion! detection,! the!Alarm! feature!
also!monitors!the!other!objects! like!lights,!blinds,!doors,!etc.! !The!owner!has!also!turned!on!









action! interaction! as! described! in! Section! 3.4.! In! this! interaction,! the! climate! control!










then! there!will! never! be! the! case!where! the! sensor! detects! this!motion.!As! represented! in!
Figure!4.10,!it!is!clear!that!this!formula!is!not!true!and!modeljchecking!fails!on!this!formula.!!!!
!
Similarly,! a! further! shared! trigger! interaction! can! occur! where! the! climate! control! service!
opens!the!windows!and!blinds!and!triggers! the!motion!detection.!Since!motion!detection! is!
shared!between!different! components! of!Home!Automation,! the!movement! caused!by! the!













This! model! checking! formula! checks! whether! the! motion! detection! triggered! by! climate!













been! applied! to! the! components! of! the! Home! Automation! based! on! the! operational!
semantics! presented! in! Chapter! 3.! Using! generics! and! the! associated! algorithm! for! the!
processing!of!generics,!the!Lex!and!Yacc!prejprocessor!generates!the!input! language!for!the!




properties! are! applied! to! the! NuSMV! model! to! verify! the! classified! properties! for! the!
composed!components!of!the!Home!Automation.!!
In! summary,! the! ability! of! the! Orthogonal! Fault! Tolerance! Framework! to! provide! fault!
tolerance! generics! based! on! the! constraints! and! relationships! is! shown! with! the! worked!
example! of! Home! Automation.! This! Chapter! has! successfully! shown! the! composability! of!
orthogonal!fault!tolerance!features!and!exhibited!the!feature!interaction!approach!to!detect!
potential!undesirable!feature!interactions!as!classified.!!
Further! evaluation! and! analysis! will! be! presented! in! Chapter! 6,! based! on! the! evaluation!
criteria! of! separation! of! concern,! expressiveness! of! fault! tolerance,! composability,!
compositionality!and!soundness!of!feature!interaction!analysis.!!









The# Therac*25# was# a# computer*controlled# medical# machine# used# for# medical# radiation#
therapy#in#the#1980s,#and#developed#by#AECL#(Atomic#Energy#of#Canada#Ltd.).#It#was#known#
as#a# linear#accelerator,#as# it#accelerated#a#beam#of#electrons#at#high#energy# to#generate#X*
rays.# Electron# beams# were# used# to# treat# shallow# tissues# whereas# X*rays# were# used# for#
deeper#treatment.##
The#Therac*25#software#was#developed#by#a#single#person,#using#PDP#11#assembly#language,#
and# involved# the# re*use# of# some# of# the# routines# from# the# earlier# Therac*6# and# Therac*20#
software.# However,# both# of# these# earlier# systems# had# a# hardware# single*pulse# shutdown#
circuit;#this#acted#as#a#hardware#interlock#to#prevent#overdosing#by#detecting#an#unsafe#level#
of#radiation#and#halting#beam#output#after#one#pulse#of#high#energy#and#current.#In#contrast,#
software# was# responsible# for# monitoring# the# whole# procedure# of# the# treatment# with# the#
Therac*25,# including#information#about#the#prescribed#dose,#and#setting#up#the#machine#by#
turning# the#beam#on.#When#an#operator# turned# the#beam#on,# it#was# assumed# that# all# the#
operational#checks#on#the#physical#status#of# the#machine#were#satisfied.#This#software#was#
also# responsible# for# the# turning# the# beam# off# on# the# completion# of# the# treatment,# or# on#
malfunctioning#of# the# software.#There#was#also#an# interlock# system#that#was#controlled#by#
software,#to#shut#down#the#machine#in#the#presence#of#hardware#malfunction.##
The# reason# for# selecting# the# Therac*25# as# a# case# study# is# it# has# been#well# documented# in#
terms#of#its#behaviour,#the#various#software#errors#that#occurred,#and#the#recommendations#
for# future# safety*critical# software#development.# There#are# also# several# formal# specification#
and#verification#studies#available#on#this#case#study.##
The# Orthogonal# Fault# Tolerance# (OFT)# framework# proposed# in# this# thesis# provides#
redundancy#and#self*checking#capabilities# through#the# introduction#of#design#diversity# fault#
tolerance# features# to# reduce# the# chances# of# software# errors.# With# the# automatic#
93#
#
composition#of# these# features#based#on# the#operational# semantics,# it# is# claimed# to# reduce#




the#Therac*25# system,# in#which# three#people#were#killed#and# three#were# seriously# injured.#
The# reasons# behind# these# accidents# were# two*fold:# software# errors# in# the# interface#
component#and#the#failure#of#the#software#interlock#system.#These#accidents#have#been#well#







to# the# problem# of# an# overdose# being# given# to# the# patients.# The#machine# also# displayed# a#
“treatment# pause,”# indicating# a# problem# of# low# priority# in# “dose# input# 2”.# There# was# no#
explanation#of#this#error#messages#neither#in#a#manual#nor#in#documentation#of#the#Therac*
25.#This#was#the#cause#of#the#third#accident,#since#the#operator#had#ignored#the#low#priority#
















After# investigating# the# reasons# behind# these# incidents,# it# was# found# that# the# Therac*25#
accidents# involved# software# coding# errors# as# well# as# errors# in# software# requirements#
[Leveson# 1993].# Basic# software# engineering# principles# such# as# proper# documentation,#
software# quality# assurance,# errors# explanations,# were# violated# in# the# Therac*25# software.#
The#design#of#the#Therac*25#software#did#not#contain#self*checks,#error*detection#and#error#
handling# features# [Leveson# 1995].# Some# of# these# software# errors# had# also# existed# in# the#
Therac*20# software# (elements# of# which# had# been# re*used# in# the# Therac*25# software),# but#
independent# hardware# interlocks# on# this# earlier# machine# had# protected# patients# from#








• Documentation# and# manuals# should# be# written# properly# so# that# reusability# can# be#
achieved.#
#
Hardware# related# recommendations# were# also# made# such# as# design# and# testing# of# the#
hardware# of# the# Therac*25.# Suggested# hardware# changes# were# to# have# extra# protection#
against# software# errors,#where# again# the#main# focus#was# beam# shutoff,# energy#mode# and#
shield# position.# Hardware# is# beyond# the# focus# of# this# thesis,# but# the# proposed# OFT#
framework#will#focus#on#the#other#recommended#points#from#above.#!
5.1.3( Orthogonal(Fault(Tolerance(and(the(Therac225(System(
As# already# stated# in# section# 5.1.2,# the# Therac*25# accidents# were# due# to# poor# software#
engineering# principles# when# designing# and# implementing# the# system.# There# was# no# clear#
specifications# and# verification# of# the# system,# and# the# fault# handling# or# fault# detection#
mechanism#embedded# in# the#Therac*25#complex# software#were#not# sufficient# to#deal#with#




With# reference# to# the# recommendations# suggested# earlier,# the# proposed# orthogonal# fault#
tolerance#framework#offers#diversity#and#redundancy#along#with#the#formal#specifications#of#





1994].# This# parameterisation# can# be# done# by# introducing# different# fault# tolerance#
mechanisms,#as#will#be#illustrated#in#section#5.2.#
With# the#help#of# the#OFT# framework,# the# composition#of# fault# tolerance#mechanisms#with#
the# system’s# components# is# carried# out# with# the# help# of# operational# semantics# and# logic#
properties#are#verified#with#a#model#checking#tool.#Logic#properties#can#be#written#in#CTL#or#








placed# and# bombarded# with# accelerated# electrons# (high# energy)# that# results# in# an# X*ray#
beam.#The#risk#here#was#that# it#proved#possible#to# fire#the#high#energy#electrons# (X*ray)#at#
the#patient#directly#without#placing#the#shield#correctly#in#between.##Therefore,#the#position#
of# the# shield# has# a# significant# importance# in# the# whole# procedure# of# radiotherapy# in# the#
Therac*25.##










• Mode# of# operation:# the# mode# can# be# set# to# either# X*ray# treatment# or# electron#
treatment;#






Initially,# in# section# 5.2.1,# the# Therac*25# system# will# be# presented# using# Statecharts,# as#
represented# in# [Bolton#2008].# The# clarity#of# specification,# and# the# similarity#with# the# finite#
state#machines#required#by#the#proposed#OFT#framework,#mean#that# this#published#formal#
model# is# adopted# as# the# representative# specification# of# the# Therac*25# system.# Then# in#











Figure# 5.2# shows# the# Statechart# model# for# the# Therac*25’s# interface# component# [Bolton#







the# next# state# will# be# “EDataEntry”.# In# states,# “XDataEntry”# and# “EDataEntry”,# the#
parameters# for# the# X*ray# and# Electron#beams# are# entered# and# can#be# edited.# The#upward#
error# shows# that# the# editing# leads# the# system# to# the# edit# state.# An# Enter# event# leads# the#
system# to# the# “XBeamReady”# and# “EBeamReady”# state,# and# then# the# Fire# event# indicates#
that#treatment#is#administered#while#the#beam#is#firing.##






it# is# necessary# to# present# the# Statechart# model# for# the# machine# component# since#










At# initialisation,# all# three# statechart#models# are# synchronised# awaiting# SelectX# and# SelectE#
commands.#In#BeamLevel#model,#with#the#SelectX#command,#the#system#transitions#to#mode#
X# (x*ray),# whereas# the# SelectE# command# causes# the# system# to# transition# to# mode# E#










































The#textual# form#of#the#finite#state#machine#(in#NuSMV#format)# is#presented# in#Appendix#B.#



















































This# section# has# presented# the# implementation# of# the# interface# and# the# machine#
components# as# finite# state# machines# in# NuSMV.# Traces# have# been# provided# to# show# the#
















in# CTL# and# LTL# will# be# used# to# prove# the# correctness# of# the# behaviour# once# the# fault#
tolerance#mechanisms#have#been#introduced.##
#(
5.3.1( Composition( of( N2version( Programming( Mechanisms( with( the(
Therac225(Component(
As#described# in#chapter#3,# there#are#various#different#software# fault# tolerance#mechanisms#
that#could#be#applied#to#this#case#study,# including#Recovery#block,#N*version#programming,#
and#N*self#checking#programming#mechanisms.#Similarly,#there#are#various#different#forms#of#
adjudicator# that# can# be# used# with# these# fault# tolerance# mechanisms.# A# few# of# these#
mechanisms# have# already# been# used# with# the# worked# example# of# the# Home# Automation#
system# presented# in# Chapter# 4,# such# as# AT# and# Recovery# block.# For# illustrative# purposes#
here,# the# N*version# programming# mechanism# is# selected# to# compose# with# the# Therac*25#
system.# The# adjudicator# that# will# be# used# with# N*version# programming#mechanism# is# the#










state#machine# sub*model,#Spreader# in# Fig#5.6,#determines# the#automatic#placement#of# the#
spreader# based# on# the# chosen# event.# According# to# this# model,# on# the# occurrence# of# the#










































SelectE# when# transitioning# from# the# Edit# state# to# the# states# XDataEntry# and# EDataEntry.#
Hence,# the# possible# execution# options# for# the# composition# of# fault# tolerance# with# this#
portion#of#the#Interface#component#are#as#follows:#
Edit !"#"$%& XDataEntry, g !! g′!Edit!‖!g !!,!"#"$%& XDataEntry !!!!!!!!!! ia !Voting!succeeds;R!!is!the!final!voting!result!#
Similarly,#for#the#event#ESelect,##











fault# tolerance# generics# independently# based# on# the# algorithm#presented# in# Section# 3.3.5.#
This#can#be#applied#to#the#Interface#component#of#the#Therac*25#software#as#follows.#Again,#






























the# pre*processor# performs# the# composition# of# the# Therac*25# components# and# the# fault#

















By# introducing# the# N*version# programming# fault# tolerance# mechanism# to# the# Interface#






(i) The# voter# succeeds# and# reaches# a# majority# voting,# that# allows# the# X*ray# or#






the# machine# component# (composed# with# the# N*version# programming# mechanism# for# the#
automatic# computation# of# the# spreader# position),# to# verify# the# safety# of# the#model.# # The#
implementation#detail#of#the#Therac*25#component#in#NuSMV,#the#logic#properties,#and#the#









When# model*checking# is# applied# to# the# formula,# the# safety# property# is# found# true# as#
expected.# This# demonstrates# that# the# composition# of# the# fault# tolerance# mechanism# has#


















Both#of# these#properties#can#be#proved#to#be# true# in#NuSMV,# i.e.# these# inconsistent#states#
can#never#occur.#
#





BeamLevel,#Spreader#and#the#BeamFire.#A#multiple#action# interaction#can#occur# if# there# is#a#
conflict# between# the# actions# of# sub*components.# To# check# this# type# of# interaction,# the#
following#style#of#temporal#logic#formula#needs#to#be#checked:#
SPEC#AG#(BeamLevel.state#=#XSet#&#Spreader.state#=#OutOfPlace)#
This# model# checking# formula# indicates# the# undesirable# situation# where# the# state# of# the#
BeamLevel# component# is# XSet# and# the# spreader# position# is# OutOfPlace.# # This# formula# is#














Sequential(Action( Interaction:#Similarly,#another#potential# feature# interaction#can#be#where#
the# Spreader# receives# the# SelectX# command# and#brings# the# spreader# InPlace.# The# resulting#
change#in#the#environment#may#trigger#other#components#to#perform#some#action.#However,#




InPlace,# while# the# BeamLevel# component# resets# the# beam# mode# to# ESet.# This# created# a#





#In# this# chapter,# the# voting# mechanism# from# the# orthogonal# fault# tolerance# framework#
approach#has#been#applied#to#the#Interface#component#of#the#computer*controlled#medical#
machine# Therac*25.# The# N*version# programming# fault# tolerance# mechanism# has# been#
applied#to#the#Therac*25#components,#and#composition#applied#according#to#the#operational#
semantics# presented# in# Chapter# 3.# The# Lex# and# Yacc# pre*processor# processed# the# fault#
tolerance#generics#based#on#the#algorithm#presented#in#Chapter#3.#This#generates#the#input#
language#for#the#NuSMV#model#checking#tool#that#is#used#for#the#feature#interaction#analysis.##
CTL/# LTL# logic# properties# are# applied# to# the# NuSMV#model# of# the# Therac*25# to# verify# the#
given#properties#for#the#composed#components.##
In#this#Chapter,#it#has#been#shown#that#the#well#documented#and#published#serious#software#
error# is# removed#with# the# introduction# of# N*version# programming# fault# tolerance.# Further#
potential#feature#interactions#in#the#Therac*25#software#system#were#classified#and#validated#
using#CTL/LTL#logic#properties#in#NuSMV#model#checking.###









The# goals# of# this# chapter# are# to# evaluate# the# OFT# framework# and# to# demonstrate# the#
successful# integration# of# design# diversity# fault<tolerance# mechanisms# with# system#
components.#The#evaluation#of#this#framework#is#based#on#the#criteria#outlined#in#Chapter#3:#
separation#of#concerns,#expressiveness#of# fault<tolerance#mechanism#for# the#orthogonality,#




thesis# meets# the# desirable# criteria# described# in# Chapter# 1# and# which# have# formed# the#
comparison# criteria# in# Chapter# 2.# In# particular,# the# evaluation#will# determine#whether# this#
framework# can# accurately# express# the# orthogonal# view# of# design# diversity# fault# tolerance#
mechanisms# and# support# their# composition,# followed# by# support# for# the# detection# of#
undesirable# interactions.# In# order# to#measure# these# criteria,# the# results# will# be# compared#
based#on#the#following#sub<criteria:#
Separation( of( fault( tolerance( concerns:# Concerns# are# defined# as# primary# entities# for#
decomposing# software# into# manageable# and# comprehensible# modules.# In# this# thesis,#
different# features# of# software# design# diversity# fault# tolerance# mechanisms# are# dealt# with#
separately,# including# consideration# of# their# dependency# relationships# and# constraints.# The#
orthogonal# and# separate# fault# tolerance# concerns# are# considered# helpful# in# reducing#
complexity#if#they#can#be#demonstrated#to#be#easy#to#manage,#design#and#modifiable.##
Expressiveness( of( fault( tolerance:# with# the# help# of# the# orthogonal# feature# model# and#
generics,#it#is#possible#to#describe#different#features#of#software#fault#tolerance#mechanisms#




Composability:# The# composition# of# fault# tolerance# features# with# the# system# component#
need#to#be#automatically#composable.#Hence#functional#components#of#the#software#system#
cannot# interfere# with# the# fault# tolerance# component# before# this# composition.# This# is#
achieved#by#separation#of#fault#tolerance#concerns.##







it# is# able# to# detect# all# the# potential# interactions# arising# through# the# composition# of# fault#
tolerance#with#the#system#component.#The#model#checking#approach#with#temporal#logic#is#
used# to# analyse# the# composed# behaviour# for# such# undesirable# interactions.# Note# that# a#






H1:# The# framework# presented# in# this# thesis# is# considered# as# expressive# as# it# provides#
separation# of# concern# with# an# orthogonal# view# of# design# diversity# fault# tolerance#








H3:# The# orthogonal# fault# tolerance# framework# is# sound# with# respect# to# the# interactions#
found.#For#the#purpose#of#this#evaluation,#the#NuSMV#model#checking#tool# is#used#and#this#






For# both# case# studies,# an# orthogonal# view# of# different# design# diversity# fault# tolerance#
mechanism# has# been# presented.# Different# fault# tolerance# mechanisms# were# presented# in#
terms# of# a# feature# diagram# with# dependency# relationships# and# constraints.# Furthermore,#
fault# tolerance# features# were# handled# independently# and# orthogonally# with# the# help# of#
generics,# and# a# pre<processor# underpinned# by# operational# semantics# was# used# to#
automatically# compose# fault# tolerance# with# the# underlying# system# components.# In# this#
manner,# a# good# separation#of# fault# tolerance# concerns#was#evident,#where# this# separation#
enables#the#complexity#of#introducing#fault#tolerance#to#be#managed.##
Expressiveness(of(the(Fault(Tolerance(Framework#
The# OFT# framework# is# considered# expressive# in# several# aspects,# including# the# ability# to#
express# a# variety# of# recovery# behaviours# in# response# to# occurrence# of# failure.# Different#
features# can# be# composed# automatically# with# the# underlying# system# component.# The#
labelled#transition#system#and#operational#semantics#increase#its#expressiveness#through#the#































represent# the# composition#of# the# Light#Controller#with# the# fault# tolerance# feature# and# the#
Home# Status# Controller# with# the# fault# tolerance# feature# respectively,# as# given# by# the#
inference#rules#below.#
LC! ! LC!ʹ!, F ! F!LC!‖F !,! LC!ʹ !!!!(LC!||!F!)#
HSC! ! HSC!ʹ!, F ! F!HSC!‖F !,! HSC!ʹ !!!!(HSC!||!F!)#
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Both# of# these# composed# state# machines# (i.e.# figures# 4.7a# and# b)# can# themselves# be#
composed# using# the# pre<processor# and# underlying# operational# semantics# to# give# the# state#
machine#shown#in#Figure#4.8.##
Regarding# the# right# hand# side# of# this# equivalence# relation:# in# a# similar# way,# Figure# 4.3#
represents#LC#||#HSC,#as#also#given#by#the#inference#rule:#
LC! ! LC!ʹ!,HSC! ! HSC!ʹ!LC!‖HSC! ! LC!ʹ‖HSC!ʹ !!!! LC! !HSC!)#
This# can# itself# be# composed#with# F,# using# the# pre<processor,# and# gives# the# identical# state#
machine#as#in#Figure#4.8.#







associated# with# these# features;# for# example,# these# two# features# may# require# different#
execution#schemes.###
Soundness(
The#NuSMV#tool#was#used# for#both# studies#and#was#used# to# check# for#undesirable# feature#
interactions.#These#interactions#were#first#classified#and#then#temporal# logic#formulae#were#
written# in#LTL#and#CTL#and#were#used# to#model#check#and#validate# the#different# formulae.#
Table#6.1#shows#the#number#of#interactions#obtained#by#NuSMV#in#the#analysis#of#each#case#
study.#
Analysis# of# the# Therac<25# case# study# yielded#precisely# the# correct# interactions;# that# is,# the#
known#and#published#design# faults# of# the# system#were#detected.# In# the# case#of# the#Home#
Automation# system,# the# identified# interactions# corresponded# to# the# classifications# of#
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2. The# larger# Therac<25# case# study# yielded# fewer# interactions.# However,# this# is# not#
surprising#given#the#well<studied#nature#of#this#case#study.##











two# components,# Light# Controller# and# Home# Status# Controller,# of# the# Home# Automation#
system.#The#operational#semantics#presented#in#Section#3.3.5#were#designed#as#synchronous#



















of# [Schmitt#and#Stefani#2004].# In#such#work,#different# localities#can#exhibit#different# failure#
and#control#semantics.#For#example,#whereas#a#failure#in#a#wide<area#network#may#prevent#
sub<networks# from#being#able#to#communicate#with#each#other,# the#communication#within#
local# sub<networks# is# not# restricted.# Hence# different# semantics# operate# according# to# the#
context#of#the#localities.#
Reflexive(Feature(Interaction(Resolution(through(Orthogonal(Fault(Tolerance(
In# the# Home# Automation# case# study,# the# actions# of# the# Climate# Control# component,# i.e.#
opening#windows#and#blinds,#trigger#the#motion#detection#sensor#and#result#in#a#number#of#
feature#interactions,#as#has#been#shown#in#Figure#4.10.##
A# possible# solution# to# resolve# these# interactions# is# the# introduction# of# a# fault# tolerance#
mechanism# in# the# Climate# Control# component.# Consider# the# scenario# presented# in# Figure#
4.11,#where#shared#trigger#interactions#and#sequential#action#interactions#can#occur#when#the#
climate#control# service#opens# the#windows#and#triggers# the#motion#detection.#Since#motion#
detection# is# shared# between# different# components# of# Home# Automation,# the# movement#
caused#by# the#climate#control# service#can#also# trigger# the#Light#Controller# to#move# into# the#
LBP#state,#the#Home#Status#Controller#to#move#into#the#H_occupied#state,#and#also#turns#the#
security#Alarm#on.##
Suppose# now# that# a# fault# tolerance# mechanism# is# applied# to# the# sensing# element# of# the#
Climate#Control#component,#with#the#purpose#of#validating#the#motion#sensing.#There#are#two#
ways#in#which#this#may#be#achieved.#The#first#would#be#the#application#of#an#acceptance#test#
that#checks#a#condition#relating# to# the#style#of#movement# (e.g.#duration#and/#or# location#of#
movement).# The# second# approach# would# be# to# consider# a# system# that# contains# multiple#
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1. The# OFT# framework# addresses# the# separation# of# fault# tolerance# concerns# for# the#
home# automation# and# the# Therac<25# system.# The# separation# of# concern# criteria# is#
high# as# it# clearly# demonstrates# the# separation# of# design# diversity# fault# tolerance#





2. The# Composability# criteria# for# the# OFT# framework# in# both# case# studies# is# high,# as#
different#fault#tolerance#mechanism#are#composed#with#the#specified#components#of#
the#Home#Automation#and#with# the#Therac<25# component.# The# compositionality# is#
medium,#as#in#the#Home#Automation#system#only#formula#(ii)#is#true.#Note#that#in#the#




3. For# the# feature# interaction# analysis,# soundness# is# considered# high# in# home#






thesis# brings# remarkable# benefits# for# the# incorporation# of# design# diversity# fault# tolerance#
mechanism#with# the# underlying# system# component# of# two# case# studies.# It# also# provides# a#
model# checking# approach# for# the# feature# interaction# analysis.# It# also# shows# that# this#
orthogonal#fault#tolerance#approach#is#absolutely#composable#and#partially#compositional#as#
shown#in#Section#6.3.##
The#major#benefit#of#orthogonality# is# to#enhance#the#separation#of# fault# tolerance#concern#
that#promotes#the#independence#and#isolation#of#fault#tolerance#concerns.#These#properties#
further# reduce# complexity# as# constraints# dependencies# and# relationships# between# fault#




at# the# architecture# level,# supporting# the# separation# of# fault# tolerance# concerns# as# an#










In# this# thesis,# an# Orthogonal# Fault# Tolerance# (OFT)# framework# is# proposed# to# give# an#
orthogonal#view#of#different#features#of#design#diversity#fault#tolerance#mechanisms.#A#preB
processor# has# been#developed# to# automatically# compose# fault# tolerance# features#with# the#
underlying# system#components# and#undesirable# feature# interactions#are#analysed#with# the#
help#of#the#model#checking#tool#NuSMV.#The#conclusions#of#the#thesis#are#presented#in#this#
chapter,#which# is# structured#as# follows:#Section#7.2#presents#a# summary#of# the# thesis#on#a#
chapterBbyBchapter# basis,# Section# 7.3# then# reviews# the#main# research# results# of# the# thesis#




and# providing# fault# tolerance# at# the# early# stages# of# software# development,# such# as# at# the#
requirement# specification# and# design# phase.# # Furthermore,# it# introduced# key# techniques#
within# fault# tolerant# systems# such# as# data# diversity# and#design#diversity# techniques,# single#
version# and#multiple# version#mechanisms,# and# the# potential# for# a# separation# of# concerns#
approach#within# this# field.#The# remainder#of# the#chapter# then#discussed# the# research#aims#
and#objectives,#and#the#contributions#and#the#structure#of#the#thesis.###
Chapter# 2# then# surveyed# the# existing# approaches# under# three# main# areas,# namely:# fault#
tolerance# at# the# requirement# specification# and# design# phase,# composition# techniques# for#
fault# tolerance# behaviours,# and# feature# interaction# analysis.# Different# approaches# under#
each# area# have# been# discussed# and# analysed# with# different# characteristics# in# order# to#





challenges# identified# in#Chapter#1#and#2.# In#particular,#an#Orthogonal#Fault#Tolerance#(OFT)#
framework# was# introduced.# Constituents# of# the# OFT# were# described,# namely# the# feature#
model# for# different# design# diversity# fault# tolerance# mechanisms,# and# dependency#
relationships# and# constraints# associated# with# different# features# of# fault# tolerance#
mechanisms.#The#Lex#and#Yacc#preBprocessor#was#developed#based#on#the#algorithms#for#the#
automatic#composition#of# fault# tolerance#and#handling#of# fault# tolerance# ‘generics’.#Finally,#




Status# Controller# (HSC)# have# been# used# for# illustrative# purposes.# # Different# fault# tolerance#
mechanisms#were#automatically#composed#with#the#components#of#Home#Automation,#with#





the# existing#published# formalisms# to#describe# and# validate# that# error#were#presented.# The#
fault#tolerance#mechanism#from#the#proposed#framework#was#introduced#into#the#Interface#




were# presented# such# as# separation# of# concerns,# expressiveness# of# fault# tolerance,#
composability# and# compositionality,# and# soundness# of# the# feature# interaction# approach.#














b)# To# provide# an# orthogonal# view# of# fault# tolerance# concerns# relative# to# the# underlying#
system# components.# This# orthogonal# view# also# shows# the# dependency# relationships# and#
constraints#associated#with#different#features#of#fault#tolerance#mechanisms.###
c)# Different# features# of# fault# tolerance#mechanisms#were# presented# in# terms# of# a# feature#
diagram#that#is#simple#and#consistent.##





system# components.# This# composition# was# the# second# main# aim# of# the# thesis# and# was#
underpinned# by# operational# semantics# applied# to# labelled# transition# systems# for# both# the#
fault# tolerance# generics# and# the# components# of# the# base# system.# The# preBprocessor#
automatically# transformed# the# composition# to# the# input# language#model# of#NuSMV#model#
checking#tool.##
This# is# therefore# a# successful# achievement# of# the# thesis# objectives,# and# opens# up# further#








have#been#outlined.# First,# classification# is#made# for#different# feature# interaction# categories#
and# then# these#classifications#are# represented#with#a# style#of# temporal# logic# in#CTL/# LTL# in#
NuSMV#model#checking#tool.#The#model#checker#validates#the#property#or#provides#a#counter#
trace# for# the#desired#property.#This#also#opens#up#a# further# research#area# through# refining#
the#feature#interaction#analysis#with#a#‘reflexive’#approach#to#feature#interaction#resolution,#
as#discussed#in#chapter#6.(










The# OFT# framework# presented# in# this# thesis# has# not# been# tied# to# a# particular# underlying#
platform,#component#model,#or#domain#for# its#realisation.#The#proposed#framework#can#be#
used# to# introduce# design# diversity# fault# tolerance# to# any# platform# and# to# any# component#
model#based#on#any#domain.##
6.((Underlying(Operational(Semantics(for(the(Composition((
Another# significant# contribution#of# the# thesis# has# been# the# underpinning# of# the# automatic#
fault# tolerance# composition# by# operational# semantics.# The# semantics# and# behaviour# of# a#
system#have#a#significant#impact#on#the#composition#and#on#the#overall#system.##








above,# namely# (i)# a# study# of# alternative# underlying# semantics# that# move# beyond# the#
synchronous#composition#as#presented#within#the#OFT#framework,#and#(ii)#an#investigation#in#









the# presence# of# threats# and# faults# and# be# able# to# react# to# hazardous# situations.# The#
proposed#framework,#if#extended#for#dynamically#adaptive#system,#must#be#able#to#provide#
trustworthiness# and# dependability# to# those# systems.# One# direction# to# explore# here# is# the#
models@run.time# community# and# their# use# of# software# models# to# support# runtime#
reasoning#[Bencomo#et#al.#2014].#
Integration(with(other(Feature(Interaction(Approaches(
The# proposed# framework# for# the# analysis# of# feature# interactions# is# based# on# the# model#
checking#of# temporal# logic#properties.#Many#different# styles#of# feature# interaction#analysis#
such# as# software# engineering# (including# focussed# techniques# and# process#models),# formal#




Further# work# is# needed# to# apply# the# OFT# framework# to# larger# and# more# complex# case#
studies.# There#are# two#possible#directions# that# this#work# could#go.# Firstly,# systems# such#as#
those#used#in#home#care#for#the#elderly#and#smart#cities#may#be#explored#and#examined#for#
the# variety# of# fault# tolerance#mechanisms# that# they#will# exhibit.# Secondly,# large# scale# and#
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complex# distributed# systems# could# be# studied# for# different# failure# models# and# associated#
semantics.##
7.5( Concluding(Remarks(
Over# the# last#decades,#providing# fault# tolerance# capability# at# the# implementation# level#has#
been# the# traditional# way# for# achieving# reliability.# Such# approaches# were# time# and# cost#
effective.# However,#modern# research# has# also# focused# on# providing# fault# tolerance# at# the#
requirement#specification#and#design#levels,#and#formal#properties#relating#to#reliability#can#
be# guaranteed# with# the# help# of# verification# and# model# checking# support.# Despite# the#




thesis# has# argued# the# need# for# a# framework# that# introduced# fault# tolerance# at# the#
specification#and#design#level#while#having#an#independent#and#orthogonal#view.#Hence,#the#
Orthogonal# Fault# Tolerance# framework# has# been# presented,# whose# goal# has# been# to#
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#include "y.tab.h"  /* Token definitions and yylval*/ 
void yyerror(char *); 
%}  
/=============Token Definitions and Regular Expressions and Rules for FSM===/ 
%%  
 [\t\f\r\n ]+       ; 
component  return COMPONENT; 
states   return STATES; 
start   return START; 
events   return EVENTS; 
transitions  return TRANSITIONS; 
[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_]* { yylval.str = strdup(yytext); return WORD; } 
[0-9]*   {yylval.str = strdup(yytext); return NUMBER; } 
"="   return EQUALS; 
":"   return COLON; 
"{"   return LCB; 
"}"   return RCB; 
","   return COMMA; 
";"   return SEMICOLON; 
.               { fprintf( stderr,"unexpected char '%c'!\n", yytext[0]); 
   /* or yyerror("unexpected char '%c'!\n"); */ 
   exit(-1); 
   }  
%% 
/=================================END of Rules======================/ 
 /*===================== subroutines =============================== */ 
int yywrap() 
{ return 1; } 
/* 
void yyerror(char *str) 




 //======== open a file handle to a particular file:=================== 
 FILE *fh = fopen("LCfsm.txt", "r"); // make sure it's valid: 
 if (!fh) { 
135$
$
  yyerror("I can't open LCfsm.txt"); 
  return -1; 
 } // set lex to read from it instead of defaulting to STDIN: 
 yyin = fh; 
  // lex through the input: 
 yylex(); 







The configuration file for the Light Controller and the Home Status Controller is 
represented in A.3 as follows: 
 
/*==========================Configuration File =============================*/ 
component = LC: 
states = {AL_on, LBP }; 
events = {MD, NMD}; 
start  = AL_on; MD; 
transitions = {  
 AL_on, _, MD, _, LBP; 
 AL_on, _, NMD, _, AL_on; 
 LBP, _, MD, _, LBP; 
 LBP, _, NMD, _, AL_on; 
 }; 
component = HSC: 
states = {H_empty, H_occupied }; 
events = {MD, NMD}; 
start  = H_empty; MD; 
transitions = {  
 H_empty, _, MD, _, H_occupied; 
 H_empty, _, NMD, _, H_empty; 
 H_occupied, _, MD, _, H_empty; 













































































































































































































































































































$ $ $ &&$isValidCondition(tF>c)$
$ $ $ &&$isValidEvent(tF>e)$
$ $ $ &&$isValidAction(tF>a)$
































































































































































































































component = CC: 
states = {wind_open, wind_clos }; 
temp: 18..21; 
start  = wind_open; 18; 
transitions = {  
 wind_open, _, temp <18, _, wind_close; 
 wind_open, _, 18<temp<21 _, wind_open; 
 wind_close, _, temp>21, _, wind_close; 































































































































































































































SPEC$ AG$ !$ (BeamLevel.state$ =$ ESet$ &$ Interface.state$ =$ EBeamReady$ &$ Spreader.state$ =$ InPlace$ &$
BeamFire.state$=$Fired)$
SPEC$AG$!$(BeamLevel.state$=$ESet$&$Interface.state$=$XBeamReady)$
SPEC$AG$!$(BeamLevel.state$=$XSet$&$Interface.state$=$EBeamReady)$
SPEC$AG$(BeamLevel.state$=$XSet$&$Spreader.state$=$OutOfPlace)$
SPEC$AG$(SelectX$→$AF(BeamLevel.state$=$XSet$&$Spreader.state$=$InPlace)$
SPEC$AG$(SelectE$→$AF(BeamLevel.state$=$ESet$&$Spreader.state$=$OutOfPlace)$
$
/============================================================================/$
(
(
150$
$
(
B.5( Trace(of(the(Interface(Component(
$
The$output$shows$that$the$logical$properties$are$true$as$expected.$$
$
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$
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